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FOREWORD
Once sealed off from the rest of the world during the Soviet times, the states of Central Asia today
are rapidly integrating with the global economy. The
opening up of China in the 1980s, the demise of the
Soviet Union a decade later, and the ongoing globalization have all served as grand forces facilitating this
highly monumental development. The U.S. regional
military involvement after September 11, 2001, and
engagement by other actors have further enabled
these countries to reconnect with the world, this time
as sovereign units. Today, more than 2 decades after
they gained their independence, the Central Asian
countries, along with the rest of the world, face a great
challenge and an opportunity—the rise of China, India, and resurgence of Russia. These neighboring
powers are investing and facilitating internal and external links of the region and profoundly shaping the
region’s external connectivity at the very time as the
United States withdraws its troops from Afghanistan
and sees a relative decline in its global and regional
power and influence.
In this insightful and forward-looking work, Mr.
Roman Muzalevsky, a widely published international
affairs and security analyst with hands-on experience
in and knowledge of the Central Asian region, uncovers these and other ongoing and projected economic
and geopolitical dynamics shaping what he terms a
“Central Asia Shrinking Connectivity Gap.” He then
provides timely policy recommendations for the United States for it to remain an indispensible player on
the regional and global scene capable of upholding
the global security and economic order in the face of
the rising powers. The author contends that the Central Asian states stand to benefit from the growing invii

volvement of the outside players. But he also cautions
that they may lose if they are unprepared to protect
their sovereignties by, for instance, failing to advance
their stalled intraregional integration. As it increasingly becomes a point of competition over resources,
routes, bases, and trade deals, the region faces significant prospects of integrating with the world, just as it
is set to confront a plethora of risks potentially reversing or redirecting its surging connectivity.
Mr. Muzalevsky cogently argues that the Central
Asian states welcome a long-term U.S. presence to balance other actors and to promote their links with the
global economy. The problem, he explains, is that they
view the United States as a noncommitted partner, especially considering U.S. plans to disengage militarily
from the unfinished conflict in Afghanistan. The author concludes that the U.S. future global and regional
role and capabilities depend on how successfully the
United States calibrates its grand strategy given the
current and projected dynamics, calling for a rigorous
and sustained U.S. regional strategy amid the rise of
China, India, and Russia—the growing powers that
are capable of challenging regional and, potentially,
international structures and institutions.
The Institute of Strategic Studies is therefore
pleased to offer this work as a source of major insights
for scholars and as a source of timely and critical advice to policymakers shaping the fate of the global and
regional security and economic orders.
		
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Today’s world marks the era of profound changes
in the international system over the last 2 1/2 decades.
From globalization and fragmentation tendencies to
transnational threats and the emergence of new power
centers, the international order has been under stress,
challenging the United States as the strongest power
to address security issues of global scale, including in
the remote region of Central Asia. It is in this region
that one can track the emergence of the U.S. global
supremacy after the collapse of the Soviet Union and
observe its relative decline at the start of the 21st
century due to the “rise of the rest” and the failing
war effort in Afghanistan. It is also here that old and
new power centers and aspiring contenders, some of
them nuclear-armed (like Russia, China, and India),
increasingly have tested Washington’s ability to shape
the global and regional orders. Most prominently, it
is the region that is seeing the rise of major powers,
which have been advancing its connectivity with the
global economy and causing power shifts that generate security risks and benefits for both the global order
and the ability of the United States to shape it.
In the 1980s, few could predict the collapse of the
Soviet Union a decade later, al-Qaeda attacks against
the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11), or
strong economic performance by the rising powers of
China, India, Turkey, and Russia. Equally, few could
anticipate the repercussions of these developments
on the remote, landlocked, and impoverished Central Asian region and the global order. For decades,
the Tsarist Russia’s control and the Cold War stale-
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mate had prevented the region from becoming a hub
of commerce, trade, and ideas that had existed in the
Silk Roads era centuries earlier. But the opening up of
China to the rest of the world beginning in the 1980s,
the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR), the U.S. regional military involvement after
9/11, the rise of neighboring powers, and the region’s
vast resources and transit potential have endowed
Central Asia with significantly more prospects for
integration with the international system than ever
before. These trends have expanded the global economy and benefited the region on many levels. Yet,
they have also increased the risk of collisions between
great and emerging powers, which are vying for influence in Eurasia and the global arena amid the relative
decline of American global power and the diminished
ability of Washington to shape the global and regional
security orders.
Relatively closed political and economic systems,
low levels of foreign trade and investment, the lack
of intra- and inter-regional energy, trade, and transit
corridors, insignificant information exchanges, and
poor regional political and economic cooperation explain Central Asia’s limited capacity for global economic integration. The region is “Central” in name,
but not in practice. According to Thomas Barnett,
Central Asia and a number of other regions represent
the “Non-integrating Gap”—the areas excluded from
the “Core” of globalization, represented by developed
and emerging economies that are more fully connected to the global economy. The “seam” countries,
in turn, border the “gap” and the “core” areas.1 (See
Figure 1-1.)
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The map according to Thomas Barnett, taken from Klaus Dodds,
Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, New York: Routledge,
2013, p. 20.

Figure 1-1. The Core, Seam, and Gap Countries.
However, this connectivity gap has been shrinking rapidly in recent years—in part due to the U.S.
military presence and growing influence of emerging powers (China, Russia, India, and Turkey)—on
terms that may not be conducive to regional security
or in line with visions of the United States, individual
powers, or local countries. Rapid power transitions in
Eurasia and the world associated with the rise of new
power centers have thus increased security risks, even
as they have upped prosperity and stability prospects
that arguably come with the expanding economic
connectivity. The United States should play a major
role in shaping the region’s expanding connectivity
that has been possible due to major transformational
developments.
3

These developments include the collapse of the
Soviet Union, which advanced the course of globalization worldwide; the military involvement of the
United States as the largest maritime power into the
Eurasian heartland for the first time in history after
9/11, which has put Central Asia into global spotlight
and promoted cooperation within and among actors
in the South Caucasus, Central and South Asia; the
unprecedented rise of China and India as engines
of global and Eurasian integration, which has been
reviving Central Asia’s strategic importance for major powers and transcontinental linkages; Russia’s
renewed focus on economic integration of the postSoviet space via the Customs Union (CU) and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) initiatives; and the rapid
development of Central Asia’s considerable natural
resources and transit potential, enabling the local
economies to anchor to the global economy led by traditional powers and increasingly redefined by emerging ones (potentially by military means in the future).
These trends have challenged the U.S. efforts seeking
to include fringe economies into the global system
and provide a visionary leadership in the increasingly
multicentric world.
Russia, China, and India are increasingly focusing
on the energy resource-rich Central Asia as a security
buffer zone and potential trade conduit of transcontinental proportions. The proposed TurkmenistanAfghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project; the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China
gas pipeline initiative; Kazakhstan-China gas and oil
pipeline schemes; and China’s transcontinental railway and trade initiatives, among numerous other
transcontinental projects, are already reconnecting
Central, South, and East Asia on the scale reminiscent
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of the Great Silk Roads era that had flourished centuries earlier. These developments entail considerable
economic, political, and military presence of major
actors, potentially leaving the United States on the
fringes of major dynamics shaping Eurasia.
Washington’s skewed Central Asia strategy, disproportionately focused as it has been on Afghanistan
in the last decade, has undermined its ability to shape
the global order. Meanwhile, Russia, India, and China
have invested substantial and growing political, economic, and military capital in Central Asia, turning it
into a critical component of their regional and global
strategies, while enabling the region to integrate with
the global economic system. But just as Central Asia
has proceeded with its internal and external integration, the United States is retreating, raising the question about how it has and should shape the region’s
integration with the global system on terms that are
conducive to global stability. The question is especially pertinent given the economic integration benefits of
the U.S.-led Northern Distribution Network (NDN)
running nonmilitary supplies from the Baltics via the
Caucasus and Central Asia to Afghanistan.
As a global power with democratic ideals, the
United States has done much to open Central Asia to
the global economy and thereby facilitate global security. However, it has been foregoing benefits of the
region’s shrinking connectivity gap by either ignoring
or ineffectively shaping the region’s security order
and connectivity to the global economy amid the rise
of new power centers. This is not only because of its
military withdrawal from Afghanistan, or the strong
push by Moscow for integration in the post-Soviet
space, or even Turkey’s attempted regional activism.
The U.S. relative global power is declining, in large
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part due to the rise of new power centers, prompting
a reconfiguration of the global economic and security
architecture and arguably unbalanced shift by Washington to the Pacific at the expense of other areas.
The retreat by the United States comes when a
failure to regulate Central Asia’s connectivity process
could increase global security risks significantly. This
is because no power or group of states from either inside or outside Central Asia have built a constructive
security and economic order in the region, contested
by nuclear powers that are leveraging regional resources and their regional positions for the pursuit of
global agendas. While the region’s external connectivity has conformed to the U.S. global agenda in principle, in some instances it has been diverging from U.S.
goals and interests in practice. In this context, some
have viewed the U.S. New Silk Road Strategy (NSRS)
as incapable of retaining, let alone enhancing, the U.S.
influence in the greater region, where rapidly industrializing and heavily populated India and China along
with the resurgent Russia have sought to sideline the
United States as major players.
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CHAPTER 2
EXTERNAL FACTORS AND INITIATIVES
ADVANCING CENTRAL ASIA’S CONNECTIVITY
One hand cannot clap alone.
		

Ali-Shir Nava’i1

OPENING UP OF CHINA, COLLAPSE
OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE ADVANCE
OF GLOBALIZATION
The opening up of China in the 1980s and the
break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 proved to be the
most significant geopolitical developments for Central
Asia in the last 3 decades. Once sealed off and heavily
militarized due to the Sino-Soviet tensions in the 1960s
and the Sino-Indian war in 1962,2 Central Asian states
embarked on domestic development and integration
with the global economy as independent entities beginning in the 1990s. Opportunities emerged and continue to emerge for the regional countries to build energy, trade, and transit links with Europe, Southeast
Asia, and the Middle East. These evolving “bridge”
initiatives have strengthened the sovereignty of the
republics in the region proclaimed by Russia a zone
of its “privileged interests.” With the gained independence began the process of nation-building, which
is far from complete today, including in Kazakhstan
that has emerged as the most successful Central Asian
state. However, the regional states have played an
increasingly important role in advancing economic
connectivity across Eurasia, an area that the rapidly
expanding links between the United States, Europe,
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and Southeast Asia had ignored in the post-World
War II era.3
Following a severe economic decline in the 1990s,
accompanied by the stalled intraregional integration
that had once defined Central Asia in the Soviet era,
the regional economies have been on the growing economic trajectory since 2000s, expanding intraregional
economic links and cultivating ties with a diverse
group of actors, including Russia, China, India, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, among others.4
Economic ties of Central Asian countries with China
and Russia have expanded in particular, with China
being notably proactive in shoring up its regional
economic influence as it has sought a regional and,
increasingly, global power status. Beijing’s and Moscow’s regional engagements have been predicated
on concerns about regional security, stability of the
regimes, the region’s vast resources, and the growing
involvement by potential contenders like the United
States, the European Union (EU), India, Pakistan,
Turkey, and Iran.5 However, while the external links
have allowed for the region’s trade with the rest of
the world to grow rapidly after 2000, the intraregional
trade between Central Asian economies has
been lagging.6
Central Asian states were thus thrust into globalization, being pulled to various poles yet not succeeding in building an integrated economic space or common security architecture to ensure national interests
amid the rise of new power centers. In a way, the region has become a “laboratory” for testing different
social, political, and economic models in the context
of globalization7 and a platform for interstate rivalries
over regional influence. Still, Central Asian states have
benefited from being at the crossroads of the expand-
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ing transcontinental commerce driven by China, India, Russia, Turkey, among others, helping to advance
the global trade that has grown two times faster than
the global economy over the last 3 decades.8
Given its traditional interest in expanding global
trade, the United States should facilitate the efforts of
Central Asian countries seeking to pursue a smoother
and faster integration with the world economy. This is
especially pertinent, given the lingering aftershocks of
the 2008 global financial crisis, a decline in global trade
growth compared to gross domestic product (GDP)
growth in the last 2 years, as well as the tendencies for
regional integration and protectionism often centered
around a number of economic poles represented by
established and rising powers like Brazil, Russia, India, and China. So pronounced have these trends become recently that they have prompted some to question whether we have “exhausted the drive toward
ever-more-globalization” and if “localism is on the
rise.” For example, between May 2012 and May 2013,
countries introduced three times as many protectionist measures as they implemented policies to open up
trade. Anti-trade policies alone cost $93 billion in U.S.
dollars in global trade in 2010,9 while the crisis significantly undermined world exports in 2009.10 Crossborder capital flows today are approximately 60 percent of what they were before the financial crisis. The
dire repercussions for the global economy prompted
former Assistant U.S. Treasury Secretary for International Finance Charles Collyns to remark that “globalization has stalled” and others to question whether it
was desired in the first place.11
Central Asian economies were largely spared
from the malaise, which has, in a way, helped to keep
their interests in global integration alive. However,
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Kazakhstan became a victim of its own success and
is still recuperating from the crisis, which started locally in 2007, well before it had engulfed the rest of
the world. Of all the regional countries, Kazakhstan
is the only state that has successfully promoted reforms since the 1990s, enabling it to integrate into the
global economy, even if the lack of transparency and
overreliance on external credit negatively impacted
its economy in 2007-08. Notably, the Kazakh leadership largely has viewed the crisis as an opportunity to
refine the country’s economic course, rather than retreat and redefine more than 2 decades of policies advancing Kazakhstan’s regional and global integration.
Today, the country’s leadership ambitiously seeks to
bring Kazakhstan to the world’s 30 top economies by
2050, including by leaning on emerging economies to
promote the country’s global integration.
While the global crisis rendered worldwide economic links “shallower and narrower” according to
the 2012 DHL Global Interconnectedness Index, the
depth measure of the index (i.e., how much of an economy is internationalized) has recovered to the point
where it is now 10 percent higher than it was in 2005.
However, it remains below the figure in 2007, while
the breadth of connectedness (how many countries an
economy connects with) has continued to decline and
is 4 percent lower than in 2005.12 Yet, the global trade
is regaining momentum, with exports running at a historical high of about 30 percent of global GDP, about
the same percentage share in 2008 before the crisis, according to the study. Trade and investment between
emerging countries and investments by emerging
economies into developed countries are growing and
boosting global connections.13 These trends indicate a
lot of room for further globalization, especially because
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the expansion of international information flow is just
beginning. Only about 1 percent of all letter mail sent
globally is international, while only 2 percent of voice
calling minutes are international (adding up calls over
the Internet is estimated to bump up this figure to
above 5 percent). Even Internet traffic remains largely
domestic, with international traffic reaching only 17
percent of the total.14
As the crisis has demonstrated, globalization is
certainly not without its risks, while integration into
the global economy is not always a happy ride. But
the benefits of the globalization, advanced by the
United States as the largest economy since World War
II and later co-promoted by newly rising powers, has
already reduced poverty by the millions, contributing
to socio-economic stability and security in many parts
of the world and enabling scores of developing nations to ascend to new economic heights. For Central
Asian economies that have only recently become independent, the globalization offers a chance to become
full-fledged economic subjects and turn into solidified
political entities as nation-states. In large part made
possible by the opening up of China in the 1980s and
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the expanding
economy flows across Central Asia, mainly driven by
outside powers, to offer the regional countries capabilities and the best hopes in decades to become truly
sovereign actors.
As the Central Asian states seek the benefits of
external integration, the resurgence of Russia and the
rise of China as the largest economic power in Central
Asia bring forth new challenges for the regional countries, particularly in light of impending U.S. military
withdrawal from Afghanistan, perceived as depriving them of a critical balancing force. After all, the
U.S. military and economic involvement in Central
11

Asia following September 11, 2001 (9/11) has exerted
a transformational effect on the region’s integration
with South Asia and the world.
U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC PRESENCE IN
GREATER CENTRAL ASIA AFTER 9/11
The U.S.-led Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
in Afghanistan has relied heavily on cooperation of
Russia and Central Asian countries. But despite the
predominantly military aspect of that cooperation, the
U.S.-led coalition’s involvement has produced transformational effects of geopolitical and economic nature not yet fully grasped or manifested. Not only has
it advanced the cross-border trade between Afghanistan and its neighbors to the north and east, but it
has also opened the way for inter-regional integration
involving Central and South Asia. It has further produced prospects for the two regions to connect with
the transcontinental and global economy.
The U.S. military collaboration with Russia and
Central Asian states immediately after 9/11 made
possible the coalition’s outreach to the Afghan Northern Alliance as a counterforce to the Taliban and their
al-Qaeda associates, as well as the opening of military
facilities in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.15 But it was
the opening in 2008 of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) that has unleashed a closer military and
economic cooperation within and between Central
and South Asia after decades of the regions’ relative
isolation due to the closed Soviet borders, unstable
Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier, and the still lingering
tensions between nuclear-armed Pakistan and India.16
Using commercial providers, the NDN relies on
three branches to transport nonlethal supplies to Af-
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ghanistan: NDN North, which starts in Latvia and
goes through Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan;
NDN South that goes from Georgia via Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, bypassing Russia; and
Tajik-Kyrgyz-Kazak (KKT), which originates in Kazakhstan and passes through Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan into Afghanistan. The NDN uses existing road
and rail infrastructure, but also relies on the Uzbek air
cargo hub in Navoi and sea ferries in the Caspian.17
Before the NDN came to life, the Pakistani port of Karachi handled the transit of almost 90 percent of U.S.
nonlethal goods. By 2011, the NDN had accounted for
the transit of almost 75 percent of the U.S. sustainment
cargo and 40 percent of all cargo. The NDN has allowed Central Asian states to receive U.S.$500 million
in transit fees annually. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and
Kyrgyzstan now stand to benefit from the 2012 reverse
transit deal with the United States, which allows for
transport of cargo out of Afghanistan via Central Asia
after the completion of the military mission.18 (See
Figure 2-1.)
The NDN has encouraged closer transit cooperation between Central Asian countries, which have suffered from long-standing border, water, and energy
disputes. However, it has also fostered corruption due
to a new stream of money available to relatively closed
regimes19 and authoritarian practices in a geopolitically shifting environment marked by growing links
between the region, on the one hand, and China and
Russia, on the other. Both Moscow and Beijing have
resisted the U.S. regional military presence, but have
relied on it to ensure regional security and economic
opportunities in the short term. In the meantime, the
EU and the United States have struggled to promote
institutional reform in Central Asia.
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Source: U.S. Transportation Command, taken from Ibid., Jeffrey
Mankoff, p.3.

Figure 2-1. The Northern Distribution Network.
Such reforms would allow for even faster and healthier integration within the region and with the global
economy based on genuine reforms20 rather than opportunities offered solely by the NDN or the rise of
emerging powers.
After all, the NDN is but one tool that continues
facing logistical and geopolitical challenges. A report
by the Center of Strategic and International Studies,
titled The Northern Distribution Network and the Modern
Silk Road: Planning for Afghanistan’s Future, indicates
that planners need to concentrate on the following
tasks to ensure a more efficient and reliable operation
14

of the NDN: increasing local procurement, improving
customs procedures, developing the Pakistani port at
Gwadar, improving transparency, and acknowledging tense ties within Central Asia that may threaten
the NDN and thus require conflict mitigation strategies.21 Besides these gaps, critics point to the NDN’s
failures to improve living standards and ensure a more
durable intraregional cooperation.22 Others point to
the link between trade and the NDN to be misleading
since a single party determines supply and demand
for military equipment.23
Addressing related challenges will produce benefits for the NDN, which, in turn, would facilitate the
transcontinental economic integration with a focus on
development of Central and South Asia. At the same
time, the NDN issues should not obscure the potential transformational impact of the U.S. military involvement in the greater region. Besides encouraging
closer transit collaboration within Central Asia, it has
reopened Afghanistan’s northern border for the legal
transcontinental trade with Central Asia for the first
time in decades and laid a foundation for expanding
the legal trade along the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier, enhancing trade, energy, and transit cooperation
between and within Central and South Asia.24 In the
large scheme of things, it has facilitated the muchneeded integration of Central Asian and South Asian
countries into the global economic system by focusing on the underdeveloped and relatively isolated
country of Afghanistan, which Washington’s New
Silk Road Strategy (NSRS) sees as a land bridge of the
multilayered integration.
The NDN has further revealed an economic potential that has served as a foundation for the NSRS—an
extension of previous policy seeking the integration
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of Central and South Asia. (The U.S. 2006 National Security Strategy, for instance, advocated the restoration
of “historical role” of Afghanistan as a land bridge between South and Central Asia, given the region’s strategic importance.25). Secretary Hillary Clinton stated
this when launching the NSRS in 2011:
[Let’s build] an international web and network of economic and transit connections. That means building
more rail lines, highways, [and] energy infrastructure,
like the proposed pipeline to run from Turkmenistan
through Afghanistan through Pakistan into India
(TAPI). It means upgrading the facilities at border
crossings. And it certainly means removing the bureaucratic barriers and other impediments to the free
flow of goods and people.26

A geopolitically crucial implication stemming from
the implementation of related projects is not only the
development and integration of Afghanistan into the
greater region and the world—itself a considerable
undertaking. It is also the reconnection of Central and
South Asia and their integration into the global economy as an integrated, viable, and inter-regional unit.
But the question is whether Washington is committed
and how it will respond to integration initiatives of
Russia, China, and India. After all, the United States
finds itself in a coordinating, even observing role,
which lacks necessary financial and institutional commitment. As a result, the United States may lose dividends, while China, India, and Russia seek to expand
and solidify their influence in Central Asia as engines
of global and Eurasian economic integration.
According to Professor Frederick Starr, who has
championed the concept behind the NSRS, the strategy is regional in scope given the region-wide chal-
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lenges and prospects stemming from the development
of Afghanistan and its integration into transcontinental networks of trade, energy, and transit. It is “against
no one” and seeks cooperation from other countries
to develop or finalize the following priority projects:
completing the Ring Road and Kabul-Herat highway
and anchoring them to transcontinental corridors;
finishing the construction of railway routes crossing
Afghanistan and connecting Europe and Asia; and
following through on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) and Central Asia-South
Asia 1000 (CASA-1000) initiatives linking Central
and South Asia via Afghanistan.27 The United States
has identified about 40 development projects as part
of the NSRS, focusing on NDN infrastructure to enhance trade facilitation programs.28 The NSRS “software” component is crucial to reduce corruption and
enhance efficiency at border crossings. In Uzbekistan,
for instance, one needs 71 days to export and 92 days
to import an item.29
Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central
Asian Affairs Robert Blake said this about the importance of reviving the Silk Roads:
Currently, South and Central Asia is one of the least
economically integrated regions in the world. Integration is vital to help create vibrant economies in
Afghanistan, Pakistan and the broader region, and
should be accelerated. New opportunities for cross
border trade, transportation, infrastructure development, and energy links can provide new jobs and enhance the quality of life for all people in South and
Central Asia.30

Washington’s cooperation with Central Asia is an
important component of the U.S. strategy that seeks to
integrate Afghanistan into the regional and global eco17

nomic order. The United States has assisted Afghanistan in acceding to the International Road Transport
system to facilitate trade and transit with South and
Central Asia.31 It has helped improved efficiency and
transparency of the local and regional electricity markets as part of its Regional Electricity Market Program.
It considers building and extending fiber optics links
to South Asian in order to then integrate them with
the global flows.32 The United States has also backed
the construction of the road linking Uzbekistan and
Afghanistan and a bridge connecting Afghanistan and
Tajikistan for the first time. It has further relied on the
U.S.-Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA) with regional states to facilitate intraregional trade, investment, and economic development, in addition to launching a ministerial level policy dialogue.33 While laudable, some of these initiatives
have focused more on Afghanistan than Central Asian
states in their own right over the last decade. Coupled
with its cautious policy due to concerns about Russia’s
reaction, the U.S. predominant focus on Afghanistan
has deprived it of resources and attention to pursue
a more durable, substantive, and long-term strategy
toward Central Asia.
The NSRS is unlikely to change these circumstances. Critics point to the lack of U.S. commitment,
major security and geopolitical risks, as well as the
absence of funding to pursue the strategy, portraying
the NSRS as “. . . a vision and call to action rather than
a well-articulated and organized strategy. . . .”34 They
highlight the need for more substantial aid, expanded
private sector participation, and “formidable convening powers” for the strategy to succeed.35 They also
point to prevalent corruption and red tape that serve
as major impediments.36 Furthermore, China, Russia,
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and Iran prefer the regional integration to proceed on
their own terms rather than on American terms. Some
Russian experts note that the United States developed
the NSRS to project its dominance in Central Asia after the military withdrawal from Afghanistan and that
Russia, as well as China, Iran and India, needs to counter it.37 Ever since the United States initiated Silk Road
policies in the 1990s, Russia in particular has resisted
related initiatives, perceiving them as undermining
its leverage and reorienting regional states away from
Moscow.38 In 2006, the U.S. State Department grouped
Central and South Asia into one unit, a move seen as
a way to pursue this very objective, while facilitating
the regions’ links with each other and the world.39
The projected decline in the already low U.S. funding for the region is expected to hamper the NSRS
realization given a relatively low U.S. interest in the
region in practice, disengagement from Afghanistan,
and the U.S. overall fiscal issues in the age of austerity.40 In 2010-12, the United States provided about
U.S.$520 million in security and U.S.$380 million in
development assistance, with its total aid amounting
to almost U.S.$3.9 billion since 1992 to support democratization and market reforms in Central Asia.41
Despite this valuable support, the U.S. economic presence has been insignificant compared to China, Russia, and the EU. This undermines the NSRS, which
relies on economic drivers and components to pursue
the set goals.
The criticism of the NSRS and the limited U.S. regional economic engagement raises the question of
whether the NSRS is a façade of “responsible” withdrawal from the region, packaged in the illusory
language of responsibility and commitment. While
high-ranking U.S. officials emphasize the strategic im-
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portance of Central Asia for U.S. interests,42 the reality
begs to differ. Besides the mentioned dynamics, the
United States remains a distant power that does not
enjoy major trade ties with Central Asia. More to the
point, the resurgent Russia, rising China, and emerging India pursue specific economic and political initiatives to revive the Silk Roads. These and other actors
have been implementing for years some of the components of the U.S. concept in practice. In a way, this has
provided Washington with an excuse not to extend a
long-term commitment to the region via a more direct
economic engagement. But these dynamics have highlighted the importance of the region for the U.S. grand
strategy seeking to promote global connectivity as a
pillar of world stability—a growing imperative considering the increasing capabilities and intentions of
rising powers to shape the global and regional orders.
While transformational, the U.S. military involvement and limited economic presence in the greater
region may either represent a fleeting moment in the
great sweep of history or translate into a lasting strategic dividend that Washington could exploit as it increasingly confronts new challenges. As it adjusts its
regional strategy, it should consider the constrained
yet important regional engagement by partners and
allies, such as Japan, the EU, and Turkey.
LIMITED BUT CRUCIAL INVOLVEMENT
OF JAPAN, THE EU, AND TURKEY
Japan has pursued several initiatives to revive the
internal and external connectivity of Central Asia: the
Eurasian Diplomacy since 1997; the Central Asia plus
Japan Dialogue since 2004; the Arc of Freedom and
Prosperity since 2007; and the Initiative of a Eurasian
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Crossroads since 2009. However, accommodation to
Russia’s interests, issues unique to Japan’s political
system (short terms in office, frequent elections, etc.),43
and competition from other payers have undermined
their effectiveness. In the field of democratization, for
instance, Japan is seen more as “coaxing” rather than
“cajoling” regional leaders. Many also view Japan’s
role as more focused on development than geopolitics, an approach suggesting an effort by Japan to pursue a “distinct role in international affairs.”44 Japan’s
excessive dependency on global markets for strategic
resources explains its unimposed, yet not less farsighted, strategy toward the resource-rich Central
Asia. This strategy is likely to become more active
given the rise of China, which has tense ties with Tokyo, and the expanding regional presence of India and
South Korea.45
Japan already has a major financial commitment
in the greater region, seeking to enhance its economic presence and regional security amid tensions with
China and ahead of the coalition’s withdrawal from
Afghanistan. Japan looks to Central Asia to address
concerns with regional security and access to strategic
resources considering China’s restrictions on exports
of rare-earth minerals.46 After all, Japan’s dependence
on oil and petroleum products is 99.7 percent. It also
ranks first in the world in its dependence on imports
of 20 types of essential commodities.47
Japan’s activities in Central Asia feed into its grand
strategy of liberalizing global trade and advancing an
open international system, aimed at facilitating Japan’s access to strategic resources and enhancing its
technological edge as new power centers rise to challenge its power and status. Japan intends to involve
the resource-rich region into integration processes of
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the dynamically developing East Asia, advancing its
regional Great Silk Road policy to enhance energy,
transport, and telecommunications linkages between
Central Asia and the world in order to promote the region’s connectivity with the global economy.48 Japan’s
Initiative of a Eurasian Crossroads, announced in
2009, seeks to develop energy, trade, and transit links
across Eurasia by focusing on Central Asia as a transcontinental link of growing, strategic importance.49
In the sphere of energy production and export, Tokyo had planned to participate in the TurkmenistanChina gas pipeline project, but high costs and a change
in China’s energy policy impeded those efforts.50 Still,
Japan actively supports policies of Central Asian
countries to diversify their energy export routes, including via TAPI. Japan also backs the development
of railways connections between China, Central Asia,
and Iran, which provide linkages to Shanghai in China, Pusan in South Korea, Osaka in Japan, and ports in
Southeast Asia.51 It helps upgrade and build railway
lines in southern Uzbekistan, as well as airport terminals in Astana, Almaty, and Bishkek.52 As a global
communications technology leader, it supports the
development of the Central Asian component of the
Trans-Asian and Trans-European fiber optic line.53
In Kazakhstan, Tokyo is active in the fields of
atomic energy, rare earth minerals, and industrial
technologies production. In Kyrgyzstan, it focuses on
the development of transit, agricultural, human, and
social development infrastructure. In Tajikistan, it is
involved in road rehabilitation programs, aiding the
construction of the Kurgan Tyube-Dusti Road linking
Tajikistan with Afghanistan and Pakistan.54 In Uzbekistan, Japan helps develop and upgrade telecommunication, air, and ground transit infrastructure, having
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provided U.S.$2 billion in loans to the country over
the last 2 decades. In Turkmenistan, it participates in
the modernization of ports and railways, development of gas reserves, and construction of chemical
plants worth U.S.$13 billion. Japan actively supports
the growing cooperation between Afghanistan and
Central Asia, as evidenced by its organization of the
Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction of Afghanistan
in 2012.55 In 2012, it promised U.S.$700 million to facilitate cooperation in Central Asia, rebuilding of Afghanistan, international trade, and investment.56 From
2001 to 2009, it provided U.S.$1.79 billion in humanitarian aid to Afghanistan to support reconstruction
and democratization efforts.57
In the region, Japan’s role has thus focused on development as a pillar of security, with Tokyo serving
as a major donor and a source of infrastructure assistance, which are critical for advancing the internal and
external integration of the region. But the economic,
political, and military presence and proximity of other
major powers to Central Asia have ensured that Japan
remains more of an economic rather than a geopolitical force in the region for the time being.
As in the case of Japan, the resurgence of Russia
and the rise of China have overshadowed Turkey’s
growing role in Central Asia, even if Ankara is now
a major power in its own region seeking a global
power status. Under the Erdogan-led Islamic Justice
and Development Party-dominated government since
2002, the country’s economy has become the world’s
15th largest, allowing Turkey, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member, to pursue a more
autonomous foreign policy. The stalled EU accession
process, the West’s relative decline in global influence,
the Iraq war, and other regional crises have prompted
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it to advance ties with neighbors and emerging powers as part of its “strategic depth” strategy and “zero
problems with neighbors” policy.58
Turkey’s ties with Central Asian countries, with
which it shares historic, cultural, and linguistic ties,
as well as its cooperation with Russia and China, have
been growing significantly over the last decade. Turkey is now one of the six largest trading partners for
Central Asia, with major investments in construction,
food production, hotel management, financial services, energy, information technology (IT), and telecommunication industries.59 In 2010, its trade with and
foreign direct investment (FDI) to the region reached
U.S.$6.5 billion and U.S.$4.7 billion, respectively.60
Its trade with Russia and China, the most powerful
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) actors, is
expected to hit U.S.$100 billion in both cases in the
next several years. However, Ankara is seeing growing competition in trade and investment from Iran
and India.
In 2008, Turkey launched a Silk Road Project to
help reconstruct the Silk Road by cooperating with
Russia, China, Azerbaijan, Georgia, India, Iraq, Iran,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Syria,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and South Korea.
The initiative seeks simplification of border crossing
and trade facilitation, collaborating with the World
Customs Administration, United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Europe, European Organization for Forwarding and Logistics, and International
Road Transport Union.61 Turkey has also supported
related goals through its international development
agency, TIFA created to support stability in and global
integration of Central Asia, and the Confederation of
Businessmen’s and Industrialists of Turkey, which
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has sought to expand ties with Central Asian states to
advance global trade.62 According to the Turkish Minister of Customs and Trade Hayati Yazici, “The trade
volume of the Silk Road countries has quadrupled in
the last decade and there is a noticeable shift in the
growth of these countries in contrast to Europe and
other regions.”63 In 2013, Turkey declared its interest
in joining the SCO, given the slowed EU accession
process and an opportunity to build lucrative ties with
emerging powers to the east.
But Moscow, Beijing, and Ankara are as much strategic rivals as they are partners. All three compete for
energy resources and their delivery routes, including
in Central Asia. Turkey has supported the efforts of
the regional states to diversify their energy exports
routes and sought to become an energy hub for the
region’s energy resources destined for European
markets. It supported the construction of the BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan oil and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas
pipelines bypassing Russia, and looks forward to the
participation in the proposed Trans-Caspian gas pipeline to bring Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan’s energy
resources to Europe.
Turkey has the most extensive ties with Kazakhstan, whose participation in the West China-Western
Europe corridor it has strongly supported. In Turkmenistan, it has been heavily involved in the construction and energy resources development sectors.
Despite its “zero problems” policy, it still has strained
ties with Uzbekistan over Turkey’s alleged support to
Uzbek opposition and criticism of the Uzbek regime
for the Andijan massacre that left hundreds dead in
2005. In Kyrgyzstan, Turkey supports democratic reforms, having provided humanitarian and technical
aid worth U.S.$20 million after interethnic clashes in
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2010. In 2013, Ankara offered to turn the Manas transit
center used by NATO into a commercial airport. Turkey has further supported democratization in Central
Asia and is seen as a model of development, but has
not received sufficient support from its NATO allies
in related efforts.64 Meanwhile, Central Asian states
have gravitated to Russia, the EU, the United States,
and China.65
Similar to Japanese and Turkish initiatives, the
EU’s Central Asia Strategy, launched in 2006, has advanced cooperation in energy security, rule of law,
democratization, and conflict prevention in the region. The EU is also increasingly involved in border
management, energy, transit, and trade facilitation,
representing one-third of the region’s external trade.
But the EU’s largely developmental rather than geopolitical role has ensured that the union has remained
a marginal geopolitical actor compared to the United
States, Russia, and China. However, the uncertain future of Afghanistan explains the EU’s recent push for
a security role in the region.66
Like Turkey, it actively supported the BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan oil and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas
pipelines, which have enabled Azerbaijan and Georgia to access Western markets. Since 2006, the EU has
actively sought to facilitate a southern energy corridor to bring Caspian gas to Europe following a Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute. The proposed Nabucco
pipeline was meant to do the job, but it has become
less viable given EU’s complicated politics, uneasy
ties between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, the rival
Trans-Anatolian Pipeline advanced by Azerbaijan and
Turkey, and Russia’s strong resistance to the pipeline
bypassing its territory.67 The EU continues its efforts
to develop westward energy connections from the
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Caspian and Central Asia, but it is China’s growing
energy demand that may undermine the EU’s energy
import policy, despite Turkmenistan’s promises to accommodate the EU’s projected gas demand.
The EU’s larger energy strategy, which seeks to
diversify sources of production and import of energy supplies, given the EU’s excessive dependence
on Russia’s gas exports, has also fed on the INOGATE initiative that pursues energy policy cooperation among countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia with a strong focus on energy
security and diversification. Some of the INOGATE
programs concern the Trans-Caspian-Black Sea Gas
Corridor and energy-saving plans in Eastern Europe
and Central Asia.68 The project complements a number of trade and transit initiatives pursued under the
EU regional strategy, which seek to advance the connectivity of Central Asian states and the countries of
the Caucasus.
The Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia
program (TRACECA), launched in 1998, aims to facilitate development of transit and trade links bypassing Russia and connecting the EU, the Caucasus,
and Central Asia. However, growing investments by
other actors have questioned the effectiveness of the
program, which requires strengthening of its “institutional and policy dimensions.”69 Still, the program
has evolved somewhat over the years and includes the
Silk Wind initiative to build high-speed multimodal
container transit corridors. It also seeks to implement
electronic exchange of information and simplified border crossing procedures to reduce transit times.70 The
EU further supports the Viking Railroad railway and
maritime project linking Scandinavia, the Caucasus,
Central Asia, and China, with Kazakhstan expressing
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a particular interest in the initiative.71 The EU is Kazakhstan’s biggest trade partner, accounting for 37.7
percent of its exports and 32.3 percent of its overall
trade turnover in 2010.72 Much like China, the EU replaced Russia as Central Asia’s largest trading partner, expanding the region’s westward connectivity.73
Besides separate multilateral connectivity initiatives, the EU has also provided development aid to
the region to improve domestic, intraregional, an
international connections of the local economies. It
provided € (euro) 750 million of aid during 2007-13,
with 30 percent of funds intended for facilitation of
regional integration in the areas of energy, transit, environment, and education. For 2014-20, it has pledged
to provide about € 1 billion to support socio-economic
development and regional security via bilateral and
multilateral funding. Kazakhstan will no longer receive bilateral funding, but will be eligible for regional
funding.74 The EU further provides 70 percent of the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) budget and 62 percent of capital for the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), which supports projects worth U.S.$3 billion,
which is crucial given their focus on security and development.75 Moreover, the EU companies are some
of the region’s major investors and are particularly
active in Kazakhstan.
Despite its crucial development role that has been
enhancing the connectivity of Central Asian countries
with the global economy, the EU’s agenda has not resulted in effective implementation of governance, rule
of law, and democratization programs. While part of it
has to do with the design and effectiveness of the programs themselves, the lack of desire and cooperation
by local elites to pursue genuine democratization has
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constrained related efforts as well. Meanwhile, Russia
and China have invested and donated considerable
aid and resources without conditions on development
and democratization. This does not lessen the importance of the EU’s largely developmental approach but
reveals its constraints given the growing presence of
China, which serves as an additional and major resource of investment and aid.
CHINA’S RISE AND GEOPOLITICAL
REALIGNMENT IN THE HEART OF EURASIA
Threats of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism,
Central Asia’s vast energy resources, concerns about
stability of regional regimes and China’s Xingjian
province, China’s expanding trade, and policies of the
West, Russia, and India—all explain China’s growing
interest in the region in the last 2 decades. China’s strategy, guided by the need to pursue “comprehensive
security” by addressing both conventional and nonconventional threats,76 hinges on its rapid economic
expansion. This growing engagement has made China
the dominant economic actor in Central Asia and is
bound to accelerate the geopolitical realignment in the
heart of Eurasia, expanding the region’s connectivity.
As an Indian analyst put it, “The frontiers of China
are moving even if its boundaries are not.”77 China has
been driving the global trade growth for years, pursuing trade routes all around the world, including increasingly with and through Central Asian states. (See
Figure 2-2.)
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China accounts for half of the fastest-growing trade routes in recent times...
A selection of the world's 20 fastest-growing trade lanes >US$20 bn annually (2012), based on
2005-2012 CAGR of imports and exports in current US$ (includes re-exports)
Note: Singapore excluded from map owing to the extent of re-imports and re-exports.
Source: UNComtrade.

Source: Goldman Sachs, taken from Sam Ro, “Map: The world’s
fastest-growing trade routes since 2005,” Business Rider, December
24, 2013.

Figure 2-2. The World’s Fastest-growing Trade
Routes since 2005.
In Central Asia, Beijing has relied on the SCO,
bilateral deals, and its Silk Road Economic Belt strategy unveiled in 2013 to advance its economic agenda. China has attempted to maintain its impressive,
decades-long economic growth and advance national
and regional security and development by ensuring
continued flows of labor, capital, resources, and technologies that link its internal and neighboring economic zones. The underdevelopment of China’s restive Xingjian, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia, as well as the
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proximity of these areas to Central Asia, has driven
Beijing’s interests in the region. For China, Central
Asia is a springboard for developing the areas and
expanding China’s own internal and external
connectivity.
Already, more than half of external trade of Xingjian, which hosts China’s nuclear testing ground at
Lop Nor and nuclear ballistic missiles, is with Central
Asia.78 Despite the expected change in China’s economic growth model over the next 3 decades from the
one based on accumulation to the one based on domestic consumption, the burgeoning “Middle Kingdom” has no other way but to rely on nearby economic
zones to sustain its economy.79 This is more pertinent
for China, given the forecast slowdown of its economic growth, looming debt and difficulties associated
with the management of popular expectations.80 Central Asia’s growing strategic importance for Beijing’s
transcontinental and global policies thus highlight the
benefits and challenges for the region’s connectivity as
China seeks to secure its unity and periphery.
While China relies mostly on sea lanes for exports,
its ongoing expansion as the soon-to-be largest economy of the world has spurred increased demand for
transcontinental land corridors. China has already become the top trading and investment partner for Central Asia, sidelining Russia and providing the regional
economies with more room to maneuver. China’s
global economic reach is much more extensive than
Russia’s. Its GDP was five times the size of Russia’s in
2010, making Moscow concerned about China’s growing economic influence in Central Asia.81 Its trade with
the region in 2011 amounted to U.S.$39 billion compared to Russia’s at U.S.$16.5 billion, while its FDI hit
U.S.$2.9 billion in 2010 compared to Russia’s U.S.$3.17
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billion. In 2012, China’s trade with the region reached
U.S.$46 billion, 100 times the amount in 1992.82
In 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping signed U.S.$50
billion in deals with Central Asian counterparts as he
unveiled China’s Silk Road Economic Belt strategy to
advance economic integration across Eurasia from the
Pacific to the Baltic Sea. Notably, China has called for
improving currency convertibility as part of its strategy. Its strategy is widely seen as a countermove to
Russia’s own regional integration initiatives launched
in response to China’s growing economic influence,
as well as a response to the U.S. dollar-based trade
system.83 Despite projected benefits, China’s growing
economic presence also represents a major concern
to Central Asian countries that see their markets increasingly inundated with cheaper Chinese goods.84
China’s imperial history in the region is not helping,
either. China’s control in Central Asian areas, including Xingjian, has extended to the total of at least four
centuries.85 China’s growing regional influence projects a perception of China’s efforts to pursue “a system of tributary relations under modern conditions”
in its relations with Central Asian states.86
China’s “belt” strategy relies on several major transit, trade, energy, and investment initiatives. China is
pursuing its Pan-Asian railway plan to link 28 states
with 81,000 kilometers of railroads. As part of the plan,
Beijing intends to build a high-speed railway network
across Asia and Europe via Central Asia, linking 17
countries and comprising three major routes connecting Kunming in China with Singapore through
South Asia, Urumqi, and Germany via Central Asia,
and Heilongjiang with Southeastern Europe through
Russia. Compared to other transport projects, China
has immense financial resources to implement related
initiatives.87
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Currently, China offers Central Asia direct access
to East Asia via the second Trans-Eurasia railway and
the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-Xinjiang highway, as well
as 11 trade ports with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan.88 China has helped construct the northsouth road and the port at Gwadar in Pakistan, facilitating linkages with Afghanistan, the Arabian Sea,
Central Asia, and countries of Southeast Asia.89 China
has also helped finance the North-South corridor linking China, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan,90
and is building a rail line via Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
and Afghanistan, which will form the Trans-Asia railway network.
In 2013, China agreed to build a railroad from China to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, planning to convert
the track gauge size of Kyrgyzstan’s railways to international standards to extend links to China, Turkey, and Iran. “It is not important for China as to who
will be building this railway line. The most important
thing is that it is built,” Chinese Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Wang Kaiwen remarked on the U.S.$2 billion
project, which in Kyrgyzstan draws fears of China’s
expansion and hopes of better prospects for Kyrgyzstan’s global economic integration.91
Beijing has also been actively building roads in
the region, supporting the Western Europe-Western
China International Transit Corridor to improve main
roads linking China and Europe via Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan had seen its container rail freight traffic
rise by 62 percent during the first 9 months in 2013
compared to the same period in 2012. The rail traffic
through Kazakhstan is bound to increase as China
continues to expand its land-based trade westward.
Notably, Russia announced in 2013 that it would not
build its portion of the corridor until 2020.92
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China’s growing involvement in the region’s transit projects goes hand in hand with its successful efforts to invest in the region’s energy markets and to
develop energy export routes as alternatives to seabased corridors, which pirates or navies of major
powers, including the United States and, increasingly,
India, could challenge in times of conflict. Accomplishing related tasks would facilitate trade in energy
resources, commodities, and goods across Eurasia.
This would reduce China’s dependence on the Indian
Ocean and the Strait of Malacca patrolled by U.S. and
Indian navies, undercutting the perceived U.S. policy
of “strategic exclusion” of China.93
China’s economic reach in Central Asia is especially pronounced in Kazakhstan, where its China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) acquired energy firms Petrokazkahstan for U.S.$4.18 billion and
half of MangistauMunaiGas for U.S.$2.6 billion. It also
bought an 8.33 percent share of Kashagan oil field, the
largest discovered field in the last 3 decades, solidifying its presence in the country’s energy market.94 To
enhance its presence, China provided U.S.$10 billion
in loans to Kazakhstan in 2009 during the global financial crisis and, along with Kazakhstan, launched
the Beineu-Bozoi pipeline in 2014 to deliver up to 14
million tons of Kazakh oil to China annually.
In Turkmenistan, China loaned about U.S.$4 billion for developing South Yolotan fields and provided
U.S.$6.7 billion for the construction of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline, which has an annual capacity
of 40 billion cubic meters and runs via Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan.95 Beijing and Ashgabat now plan to build
a new pipeline to supply gas to China via Uzbekistan
and Kyrgyzstan. This new project could enhance Uzbekistan’s leverage over Kyrgyzstan, though China’s
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involvement is likely to quell related concerns. China
is the second-largest trade partner for Uzbekistan,
where it invests heavily in the transport market.96
China also built an oil-processing plant in Kyrgyzstan.
Beijing views it imperative to develop and link existing and new regional pipelines with those in China,
including the Xinjiang-Shanghai gas pipeline—a critical component of China’s West Development Strategy. With time, potential participation of Japan and
South Korea in related projects could foster a dynamic
connection between Central and East Asia,97 though
China may prevent such developments from occurring, given rivalries in East Asia.
Beijing’s growing involvement in the regional gas
and oil trade has challenged Russia, which has sought
to purchase gas and oil distributions networks to at
least control energy resource deliveries. In 2013, Russia’s gas giant Gazprom acquired Kyrgyzstan’s gas
system, promising to modernize the Soviet era network. Initially welcomed as a way to break Russia’s
regional grip, China’s emerging dominance in the region’s gas market now threatens to also sideline the
EU, potentially leaving it without projected gas imports in the long-term, a prospect that worries Washington.98 China’s growing economic presence as part
of its institutionalized “belt” strategy and the SCO
causes additional concerns, including for the United
States. Washington has traditionally viewed China’s
regional rise as a check on Russia’s advances, but now
has to contend with Beijing’s potentially dominant
geopolitical role in the region.
China’s projected military involvement to protect
its expanding economic interests adds a military dimension to the perceived regional rivalry among great
powers. China recently agreed to offer U.S.$3 million
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in loans to Turkmenistan to boost its capability against
attacks on energy infrastructure. It also pursues limited military ties with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In
2009, it offered U.S.$3.7 million to Uzbekistan to install mobile scanning systems at border crossings.99 In
2005, China “seriously considered” the possibility of
having a base in southern Kyrgyzstan to help counter
“terrorism, separatism, and extremism.”100 However,
China’s military ties with Central Asian states remain limited due to Moscow’s predominant regional
security role.
In this context, some experts discount the SCO as a
counterbalancing tool of Kremlin and Beijing. However good it may be for expanding the region’s connectivity and advancing stability through counterterrorism
programs, the SCO lacks the spirit of multilateralism,
with China and Russia preferring bilateral deals with
regional states to bypass each other’s potentially adverse responses. Membership by Central Asian states
in the SCO indicates the “primary constraint of strategic regionalism,” manifesting itself in the desire of
these countries to either restrain their more powerful
partners or at least shape more beneficial outcomes.
Internal incoherencies and antagonisms within the
SCO thus make it more of a crippled economic and
political player rather than a geopolitical heavyweight
opposing the United States or NATO. Ivan Safranchuk, editor-in-chief of the Bolshaya Igra (The Great
Game) magazine, put it best: “SCO does not intend to
oppose the US globally or regionally, so that it operates not against America, but without it.”101
The SCO’s real or perceived capabilities notwithstanding, China’s rise is undeniable and set to expand
Central Asia’s eastern and western vectors of connectivity. With time, the Central Asian states may find
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it increasingly imperative to turn not only north, but
also south to deflect the pressure from the east as they
pursue an efficient and secure way of connecting with
the world. India’s delayed but potentially transformational regional engagement is there to help.
INDIA’S DELAYED ARRIVAL AND
RECONNECTION OF CENTRAL AND
SOUTH ASIA
While India is a latecomer in the region, it is not
unwelcome among Central Asian countries that are
eager to diversify ties and have access to the Indian
sub-continent and Ocean. India launched its “Connect
Central Asia” policy in 2012, seeking to link Central
and South Asia and position India as the engine of this
historically and geopolitically monumental development. According to Shri Ahamed, Indian Minister of
State for External Affairs, the new policy “is based on
pro-active political, economic and people-to-people
engagement with Central Asian countries, both individually and collectively.”102 For India, reconnecting
with Central Asia is becoming an urgent imperative
to ensure long-term development of Afghanistan,
strengthen India’s position relative to China, and promote its expanding trade by land via Central Asia to
European and Middle Eastern markets, which is expected to hit U.S.$100-120 billion annually by 2015.103
As part of the policy, India plans to set 14 flight
links with all Central Asian states, develop local IT,
energy, banking, and pharmaceutical industries, and
to build energy infrastructure and e-networks linking the two regions. In Kazakhstan, Indian firms are
involved in coal, oil, and uranium industries. India
has imported more than 3,500 tons of uranium from
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Kazakhstan since 2009.104 In Tajikistan, Indian companies are involved in a hydropower project, a reflection
of importance India attaches to the region’s hydroenergy capacity for the CASA-1000. In Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan, Delhi plans to open an Indian-Central
Asia University and a military hospital, respectively.
In Uzbekistan, its companies are present in the pharmaceuticals, IT, construction, energy, and mining sectors. As the world’s sixth largest energy consumer, it
is a major party to TAPI and CASA-1000, seeking an
active role in the development of the region’s energy
reserves to reduce its dependence on energy imports
from the Middle East and meet its long-term economic
growth projections. Delhi has recently expressed interest in building a gas pipeline from southern Kazakhstan to India. However, instability in Pakistan
and Afghanistan, as well as the standoff between Iran
and the West has impeded India’s efforts to import
energy resources from Central Asia and Iran (via proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline).105
India’s “connect” policy seeks to address the
region-wide instability by focusing on the development of Afghanistan to facilitate inter-regional development. Delhi plans to invest U.S.$100 million to
develop the Iranian port at Chabahar with a view to
connect it to Afghanistan and on to India via railways
and roads. It spent U.S.$136 million to connect the
port with the Ring Road in Afghanistan, where it has
invested U.S.$2 billion in infrastructure over the last
decade and sought to develop the Hajigak and other
deposits worth U.S.$1-3 trillion. The port will enable
Delhi to access Central Asian markets without relying
on Pakistan and position it favorably vis-à-vis China,
which helped build a rival Pakistani port at Gwadar,
linking China and the Persian Gulf. The Chabahar
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port is but one link in the India’s North-South Transit
Corridor connecting the Indian-built Zaranj-Delaram
highway in Afghanistan and providing an outlet for
India’s goods to Central Asia.106 In case of entente between Iran and the West, the corridor would facilitate
India’s trade with Central Asia, expanding a northsouth vector of the transcontinental trade. Besides its
funding for roads, railways, medical facilities, power
networks, and other socio-economic infrastructure,
India helped Afghanistan become a member of the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation to
boost its long-term development and stability,107 an
essential prerequisite for India’s own unimpeded economic rise and reconnection with Central Asia.
India’s strained ties and rivalry with Pakistan over
influence in Afghanistan and its strategic competition
with China have dictated its outreach to Afghanistan
and Central Asia. In line with its nonalignment tradition, India has positioned itself as an autonomous
actor. But it has attained only limited regional presence compared to Russia, China, and the EU, which
dominate trade and investment. India’s trade with the
region was just U.S.$500 million in 2012, compared to
China’s trade at about U.S.$29 billion (In 2010, trade
between Russia and Central Asia was € 7 billion,
which made Russia the region’s third largest trade
partner after China and the EU).
India has expressed a particular interest in cultivating defense industry ties with the regional countries.108
Besides developing a strong relationship with Uzbekistan as its major arms supplier, India has sought military ties with Bishkek and Dushanbe after opening a
mountain biomedical research center in Kyrgyzstan
and requesting access to Ayni airbase that it helped refurbish in Tajikistan. However, Russia’s military ties

39

and aid to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have prevented
it from gaining its first-ever military base overseas.
Meanwhile, China’s assertive energy policy has outmaneuvered India in the energy sphere. In 2013, India
failed to secure an 8.4 percent stake in Kashagan oil
field, which Kazakhstan chose to give to China for the
same amount of U.S.$5 billion. The deal was one of
about 20 agreements between China and Kazakhstan
worth U.S.$30 billion. Beijing also outperformed Delhi
in securing rights to develop the Galkynysh gas field
in Turkmenistan and launching a pipeline in 2009 to
supply Turkmen gas to China.109
India gained an SCO observer status to enhance
its regional influence, but it sees few prospects for
productive interaction within the group because it
perceives China as seeking to block its access to and
prevent its attempted active engagement in Central
Asia.110 The U.S. role will be critical for expanding
Delhi’s regional presence given similarity of regional
goals expressed in the Indian “connect” policy and
the U.S. NSRS. Looking long term, India’s expanding
global economic presence, its lagging yet promising
regional potential, and its growing interest in integrating South and Central Asia via Afghanistan has shown
Delhi’s potential as an ascending global economic
power poised to transform the landscape of the broader region by expanding Central Asia’s southward vector of connectivity and reconnecting the region with
South Asia. India’s projected rise adds a layer of complexity to the already complicated regional dynamics,
including those centered on Russia’s resurgence in
Central Asia.
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RUSSIA’S RENEWED FOCUS ON ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE
Sharing traditionally strong yet increasingly
contested ties with Central Asian states, Russia has
viewed Central Asia as a zone of its exclusive interests, leveraging its regional policy to advance a multipolar international system. Besides seeking to address
concerns about regime stability, terrorism, Islamic
fundamentalism, and narco-trafficking in Central
Asia, Moscow has sought to retain its waning grip
on the production and exports of the region’s energy
resources and prevent China, the EU, and the United
States, among other actors, from extending their influence in the region,111 including by pursuing recent integration initiatives in the form of the Customs Union
(CU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). While
these initiatives can advance the region’s connectivity
on Russia’s terms, they could also impede its multivector orientation and weaken the sovereignty of the
Central Asian states.
Russia’s regional strategy has not been without
setbacks, which nevertheless helps explain Moscow’s
efforts to revitalize integration processes in the postSoviet space. Despite relative success, Russia has not
developed sufficient “soft power” capabilities, resorting to “hard power” to satisfy its ambitions and, as a
result, undermining the appeal of the CU and EEU integration initiatives. In the 1990s, Russia had struggled
to retain its influence in the post-Soviet space, even
though the existing economic infrastructure and links
left over from the heydays of the Soviet Union served
as the basis for the now sovereign regional states to
run their economies. Not only was Russia weak, but
it has also perceived itself contending with new actors
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in its own backyard. All around, Russia has seen enemies bent on containing its wishful rise. The perceived
encroachment of the West and the “color” revolutions
in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan has intensified
Russia’s fears of the U.S. rising influence in Central
Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus. Meanwhile,
China’s rapidly growing influence in Central Asia has
put Russia on alert, prompting Moscow to manage
China’s regional rise within SCO while leaning on it
to deter U.S. ambitions. Russia’s joint call with China
in 2006 and in 2014 for Washington to vacate military
bases in Central Asia and Afghanistan show their
uneasiness about the U.S. regional presence.
Since 2000, Russia’s growing energy export revenues have enabled it to project a more assertive
economic policy at home and abroad. However, the
challenges posed by the West in Eastern Europe and
the South Caucasus, as well as by China’s expanding economic influence and U.S. military presence in
Central Asia, have grown concurrently in scope and
perception. Russia’s growing economic clout has fed
imperial nostalgia and Russia’s perception of itself as
a great power, making the implementation of measures to achieve related ambitions a more likely and
accepted scenario in Central Asia and beyond. The
resistance of regional states to perceive Russia’s efforts at domination, the need for Russia to buttress its
image of a great power through economic and military means, as well as real and perceived attempts by
the West to expand its regional reach have resulted
in a shaky stability on the EU’s doorstep. The 2008
Russian-Georgian war and recognition by Moscow of
Georgia’s breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia as independent states, as well as the 2014
annexation of largely Russian-populated Crimea fol-
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lowing a local referendum and the standoff between
Russia and the West over Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, are all outcomes of these volatile dynamics.
In a way, these dynamics have served to hamper the
external connectivity of the broader Caspian region.
Pointedly, none of the Central Asian states have recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia or the annexation of Crimea, though their negative
reactions have been muted.
Under Vladimir Putin’s second presidency since
2012, Moscow’s drive for post-Soviet integration has
intensified, with Russia supporting the creation of the
CU, the EEU, and the Eurasian Union by 2025, which
would include EEU members and potentially Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, among possible others. President Putin stated this about the CU and EEU:
We suggest a powerful supranational association
capable of becoming one of the poles in the modern
world and serving as an efficient bridge between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region. This project also implies transitioning to closer coordination in
economic and currency policies in the Customs Union
and [Common Economic Space] and establishing a
full-fledged economic union.112

As other emerging powers, Russia finds it hard
competing globally in certain markets and seeks regional integration to protect itself from global competition while facilitating access for its products to
regional markets.113 The global financial crisis underscored Russia’s vulnerabilities, increasing the negative
perception by the Kremlin of the U.S.-led global economic order that Moscow, along with Beijing, Delhi,
and Brasilia feels it could and should challenge. Seen
in this light, the CU and EEU enhance the region’s connectivity but could impede its multivector orientation.
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According to a 2013 survey, two-thirds to threefourths of the CU members population viewed the
CU favorably, with the perception declining from
80 percent to 73 percent in Kazakhstan and 72 to 67
percent in Russia (due to implications stemming from
the second wave of the global financial crisis in 2013),
yet rising in Belarus from 60 to 65 percent compared
to 2012. Interestingly, the population in Uzbekistan,
whose regime resists any, especially Russia’s, integration schemes, had the highest favorable perception (77
percent), followed by Tajikistan (75 percent), Kyrgyzstan (72 percent), Armenia (67 percent), Georgia (59
percent), Moldavia (54 percent), Ukraine (50 percent),
and Turkmenistan (50 percent).114
Despite favorable perceptions, neither Kyrgyzstan
nor Tajikistan, both members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), rush to join the CU. According to
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), joining the CU
would decrease the amount of goods re-exported from
China through Kyrgyzstan to Russia and Kazakhstan,
affecting hundreds of thousands of people engaged in
trade. Kyrgyzstan demands financial aid, stabilization
funds, as well as assurances of free movement of labor
and special status for Dordoi and Kara-Suu markets
that are part of the emerging Silk Road serving China’s exports and Kyrgyzstan’s re-exports throughout
Central Asia and Russia, among other conditions, in
return for membership.115 In May 2014, Kyrgyzstan
submitted a new roadmap for joining the CU that
reflects the conditions.
The question of membership in the CU, and potentially the EEU, for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan mirrors
the choice before Ukraine: in both cases, Russia seeks
to thwart the designs of its perceived challengers, seeking to prevent Ukraine from pursuing the Free Trade
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Association Agreement and pro-Western course and
preventing Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from falling
into China’s orbit and pursuing an Eastern course.116 In
Central Asia, the U.S. military involvement and China’s rapidly expanding economic influence, in large
part, has prompted Moscow’s vigorous integrationist
course. With a double-headed eagle as its coat of arms,
Russia finds such dual dynamics geopolitically hard
to tolerate and, as recourse, has continued building
for itself a distinct, Eurasian geopolitical identity by
pursuing an integration project in the heart of Eurasia.
Secretary Clinton once remarked on Russia’s integration initiatives: “We know what the goal is, and we
are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down
or prevent it.”117 The remark has played to Russia’s
perception of U.S. hostile intent to undermine Russia’s influence and prompted the Kremlin to pursue
“the goal” even more actively. This perception has
also been extended to China, which has emerged as
a formidable economic player, challenging Russia in
Central Asia in the energy, trade, manufacturing, and
investment sectors. Russia is simply not ready to cooperate with China on regional economic integration.
But it does not necessarily suggest it cannot cooperate
with Beijing on larger strategic issues in the same way
as the United States may have trade disputes with
its EU allies, but work with them on other matters.118
While their interests converge in their common pursuit of global status, the interests of Russia and China
have diverged over regional economic goals.119
Moscow’s close ties with Kazakhstan and Belarus
help Russia facilitate its integration drive. In May
2014, the parties created the EEU, though many view
the move premature. Both Minsk and Astana have
raised issues with the CU and EEU as better serving
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Moscow’s interests. Just a month earlier, President of
Belarus Alexander Lukashenko questioned the utility
of creating the EEU, citing the country’s disagreement
with the position of energy-rich Russia and Kazakhstan to retain tariffs on energy exports for the next decade.120 Meanwhile, President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev has emphasized that the EEU is “not an
attempt to restore the USSR; there is no return to the
past, and there won’t be . . .,” a position reflecting the
interest of the Kazakh leadership in preventing the reemergence of Soviet Union-type structure that would
compromise Kazakhstan’s sovereignty. Furthermore,
Astana had not been happy about Moscow’s attempts
“to assume new powers” within the CU commission.121 Meanwhile, debates have surfaced whether
the CU had done more bad than good for Kazakhstan.
The country’s imports from Russia had grown from
31.3 percent in 2009 to 42.8 percent in 2011, causing
an increase in trade deficit by 63 percent and a drop in
real income and capital returns.122 However, President
Nazarbaev is known as a protagonist of Eurasian integration and, while in power, is likely to pursue the declared course with Russia as its strategic partner while
advancing the country’s multivector foreign policy.
Deputy Foreign Minister Erjan Kazyhanov described
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy priorities this way: “The
President in his address set the priorities: Russia,
China, U.S., EU, Asia, and the Middle East. The chief
principle here is an economic profit.”123
Whether Russia and its EEU partners succeed in
their union is a big question. Besides the previous issues, the members have suffered from overlapping
functions of other initiatives, like the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS), as well as the distrust by
members who are guarding their newly gained sover-
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eignties and successfully cultivating diverse ties with
major powers. Sergei Chalogo, a Russia expert, has
pointed to the ineffectiveness of Russia-led initiatives
this way:
The EurAsEc’s anti-crisis fund is one’s own small IMF
[International Monetary Fund], the single economic
space—one’s own EU, the CU—one’s own WTO, while
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—
is one’s own NATO. That is, everything is as it should
be with adults; only that nothing works.124

How the EEU members lead a union comprised of
economies of varying scale and pace of development
is unclear. Nor is it clear what immigration policy
would look like once others join, if at all, given strong
nationalism in Russia and growing calls for visa restrictions and quotas for laborers from Central Asia
and the South Caucasus. The saying captures the irony best: “The Russians want two dreams to come true
at the same time: for all non-Russians to be expelled
from Russia and for themselves to move abroad.”125
The varying pace of development of Central Asian
states (the CU, EEU, etc.) has spurred Moscow to pursue a differentiated policy by relying on multi- and
bilateral frameworks. Disparities in wealth and resources, as well as proximity to Russia, have defined
the extent of dependence of Central Asia countries on
ties with Russia. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have managed ties with Moscow on a more
independent basis compared to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which depend heavily on Russia for aid, investments, and military assistance. Russia has viewed
Kazakhstan, the largest and richest state with a strong
multivector policy and common border, as its closest
ally in Central Asia. In 2006, they established the Eur47

asian Development Bank (EDB), which now has Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Belarus as members,
to fund infrastructure projects. In 2008, they created
an Anti-Crisis Fund within EDB with U.S.$8.5 billion
in financial resources to support the poorer members
following the global financial crisis.126 In Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan, Russia has invested in hydro-energy
projects, assisting with the construction of Sangtuda 1
hydroelectric plant responsible for 10 percent of Tajikistan’s electricity production and offering U.S.$1.7 billion for construction of the 1,900 megawatt Karambata
1 hydroelectric project in Kyrgyzstan.127 Its ties with
Uzbekistan, however, are strained, with Tashkent
avoiding or resisting Russia’s integration initiatives.
Russia has also sought to partake in inter-regional
multilateral projects to retain its ability to affect and
shape regional geopolitical trends and outcomes,
even if these projects are viewed as reorienting Russia’s perceived client states. These include TAPI and
CASA-1000, supported by the United States, India,
and Central and South Asian states.128 Russia still
has a lot of economic, political, and military levers to
shape the region’s trajectory. However, Moscow views
China’s leading economic position, India’s impending
expanded involvement, and the U.S. potentially
prolonged military presence as undermining Russia’s
regional presence. Along with Russia’s rising clout,
these dynamics have prompted Moscow to up its
economic integration agenda, while relying on and
occasionally using its “hard power” to retain its
regional position. This has created opportunities
and challenges for the region’s connectivity and
local economies, which seek to harness evolving
dynamics and connectivity initiatives to improve their
performance.
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CHAPTER 3
REGIONAL CONNECTIVITY FRAMEWORK
AND PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL ECONOMIES
It is a sacred duty of each of us to increase the number of
our friends.
		

Abai Kunanbaev1

CONNECTIVITY FRAMEWORK: RESOURCES,
DYNAMICS, INITIATIVES
Central Asia’s connectivity framework is the product of the region’s vast energy, metal, and rare earth
mineral resources, developing infrastructure, attempts
by Central Asian countries to pursue multivector foreign policies, as well as regional and global dynamics
shaping numerous initiatives in the areas of trade, energy, information, and transport. As a hub of human
and resource flows linking dynamic economies in
Eurasia, the Central Asian region is of interest to both
“Rimland” and “Heartland” powers seeking to form
and direct these flows.2 To understand the region’s
connectivity framework, one has also to consider major trends that are defining Central Asia and affect the
speed and direction of the region’s connectivity.
Today, the region is witnessing multilayered, concurrent processes of traditionalization implying the
revival of pre-Soviet historic and cultural traditions;
peripherization implying the region’s integration into
the global economy as a resource base for world markets; and globalization, which is pushing the region
into global societal networks.3 Kazakhstan and, to a
lesser degree, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have
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been more successful in solidifying their sovereignties compared to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. On balance, however, some would argue that Central Asian
countries—having failed to consolidate themselves
as viable, successful, and modern nation-states—continue to be objects rather than subjects of international
affairs.4
The rise of China, India, Russia, and Turkey, as
well as ongoing rivalries over the direction of global
and regional processes, have supplemented this regional context, with select countries forming regionbased sources of influence and partnerships with other powers as a way to counter the perceived policies
of domination by other, stronger powers, including
in Central Asia. Globally, one can see such dynamics manifest themselves in a transition of power away
from the West, “the rise of the rest,” and the arrival of
multipolarity. Regionally, one can see related dynamics in the “marriage of convenience” between China
and Russia on the issue of necessary U.S. military
withdrawal from Afghanistan and Central Asia, as
well as in the expanding regional economic involvement by China, Russia, and, less so in the short term,
India. Therefore, a U.S. failure to translate its military presence into a durable and long-term economic
one could leave Washington without levers to affect
regional and global processes and outcomes.
Despite the uncertainty of the U.S. long-term engagement, Central Asia has a lot to look forward to,
given ongoing dynamics as well as its vast resources
and strategic location, standing to benefit from infrastructure, trade, energy, and transit projects. Located
in the middle of Eurasia, Central Asia can serve developing markets in the east, west, north, and south.
Already, the Eurasian continent is rapidly integrat-
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ing, with the largest share of global trade occurring
between Eurasian economies, increasingly via Central
and South Asia. While the sea-borne trade predominates, land routes are set to take on an expanding
share of continental trade due to cost and time advantages, as other integration processes have shown. The
economic dynamism of China, India, and other actors enable Central Asian countries to serve as trade,
energy, and transit conduits and access points for
goods, energy, capital, labor, investment, and ideas.5
In many instances, Central Asian states have eagerly
embraced such roles and expanded their external ties.
(See Figure 3-1.)

Part of merchandise trade realized...

Source: Gill and Raiser, 2011, taken from Ibid., Johannes Linn, p. 97.

Figure 3-1. Global Trade Flows
(2008, in billions of dollars).
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At present, traders ship about 99 percent of the
goods traded between the European Union (EU) and
Asia Pacific by sea. This trade is expected to climb up
drastically and strain the throughput capacity of the
Suez Canal, facilitating the demand for land-based
trade, including via Central and South Asia. For instance, delivering one ton of cargo from Germany to
India via the Suez costs about U.S.$3,500 and takes
about 40 days; doing so via north-south transport
corridors costs U.S.$2,500 and takes 15-20 days. The
reduction in time is a big advantage afforded by the
land-based transport, providing major trade development opportunities for Central Asia and emerging
powers,6 especially considering the major existing and
planned geopolitically significant transit corridors.
(See Figure 3-2.)

Figure 3-2. Eurasian Transportation Corridors.
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Railway corridors in Central Asia feed on the
Soviet-era railway network, but they also take advantage of the expanding networks built by China, Iran,
and the regional states. Central Asia countries are a
platform of multi-modal corridors being advanced
by: Russia- and Kazakhstan-led European Economic
Community (EEC); China- and Asian Development
Bank (ADB)-led Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program; and Europe-promoted
Pan-European Azes and the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) program. The ADB,
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Islamic
Development Bank (IsDB), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the World Bank (WB)
all back the CAREC initiative, which supports transit
system construction and facilitation projects worth
U.S.$13 billion in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, China, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In 2008, CAREC
committed U.S.$6.7 billion for major transport projects,
which include: the Europe-East Asia (U.S.$3 billion
by ADB, U.S.$2 billion by WB, and financial support
from EBRD and IsDB); the Mediterranean-East Asia
road and rail networks from China via Central Asia to
the South Caucasus; the Russia-East Asia corridor bypassing Central Asia; the East Asia-Middle East and
South Asia road linking China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; the Europe-Middle
East and South Asia road and railway lines connecting
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and later Afghanistan.7 (See
Figures 3-3, 3-4, and 3-5.)
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Figure 3-3. CAREC Transit Corridors.

Source: CAREC Project Portfolio, 2010, taken from Ibid., Johannes
Linn, p.109.

Figure 3-4. CAREC Investment Loans and Grants,
by Sector and Date, 2001-10.

Source: CAREC, 2011, taken from Ibid., Johannes Linn, p.109.

Figure 3-5. Financing of CAREC Programs, 2011.
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CAREC considers supporting the following transit links connecting: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and China; Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and China; Russia, the Central Asian
countries, Afghanistan, and Iran; Russia, Mongolia,
and China; Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and China; Russia, the Central Asian countries
except Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan.8
Markedly, Russia, India, Turkey, and Iran are not part
of the CAREC project. The initiative has made notable
progress in transport and trade facilitation but has
been less effective in the energy and trade policy areas, while excluding water management at the request
of China and Uzbekistan. It has done relatively better
on the “hardware” but not “software,” requiring improvements in legal, regulatory, and administrative
areas, as well as better linkages with national development strategies of member countries.9
The Special Program for the Economies of Central
Asia (SPECA) is another initiative supported by the
UN that advances trade, energy, and transit cooperation between Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Azerbaijan and their integration into the global economy.10
But much like CAREC, SPECA has suffered from
overlapping functions and lack of efficiencies and
coordination.11
Several existing and planned major rail corridors
serve to boost Central Asia’s connectivity. The 9,000
kilometer (km)-long Trans-Siberian Railway connects
Europe and Russia’s east, with branches extending to
China, North Korea, Mongolia, and Central Asia. Russia’s planned investments into the line by 2015 are estimated at U.S.$1.5 billion. The 11,000km-long Northern Trans-Asian Corridor links China’s Lianyungang
on the Pacific coast via Kazakhstan with Russia and
Western Europe. China plans to continue electrifying
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and double-tracking the line as it develops Xingjian
(it has double-tracked about 90 percent and electrified
about 29 percent of the line). Lianyungang serves as
the originating point for the insufficiently developed
and utilized Southern Trans-Asian Corridor, which
links Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Iran, and Turkey. The
Central Trans-Asian Corridor is another underdeveloped line, linking China and Kazakhstan with Russia
and Ukraine with networks to Poland, Slovakia, and
Hungary. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran are
developing the North-South Eurasian Corridor linking Russia and Central Asia with India and South Asia
and the Middle East. The underutilized TRACECA
Trans-Caspian Corridor, in turn, runs from Kazakhstan via Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia, with sea links to Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria,
and Turkey.12
Major automobile corridors in the development
stage include the West Europe-West China corridor,
backed by EBRD, ADB, WB, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the New Eurasian Land Transport Initiative. The former is about 8,500km-long
and, for the most part, runs parallel to the Central
Eurasian rail corridor, linking Europe with Russia,
China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The
WB issued a loan of U.S.$2.125 billion to finance the
construction of the corridor. The latter extends from
Beijing via Urumqi to Bakhty and Almaty in Kazakhstan, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, and
Belgium, and is expected to see an increase in cargo
transit through Russia and Kazakhstan by 5.2 million
tons annually. There are also major multimodel corridors involving rails, roads, and waterways that link
Europe and India via Russia, Iran, and Central Asia.
The 7,200km-long line from Bombay to St. Petersburg,
for instance, is increasingly used to accommodate the
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expanding trade between India and Europe via Central Asia. Other networks include the Trans-Caspian
sea route and the inland Caspian-Volga-Baltic waterways linking Caspian states, the Caucasus, Russia
and Europe.13 Air corridors are beginning to assume a
major importance as well, especially given the plans
of China and India to greatly increase the number
of flights to Central Asia in the coming years. (See
Figures 3-6, 3-7, and 3-8.)

Figure 3-6. Main Euro-Asian Corridors.

Figure 3-7. International Transport Corridors in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
Countries.
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Figure 3-8. Trans-Asian Railway Network.
Inter-regional energy projects are another component of Central Asia’s expanding connectivity framework, with the growing energy demand in China,
India, and the EU driving their implementation. The
major existing projects include gas pipelines from
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to China, Russia, and
Iran, as well as an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to
China. Another major planned project is the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) Pipeline, expected to supply up to 33 billion cubic meters (bcm) of
gas annually to help meet the growing energy needs
of the developing Afghanistan, energy deficit-stricken
Pakistan, and rising India. ADB approved the U.S.$7.6
billion-worth initiative in 2012, while the project parties have made purchase agreements and are nearing
concluding stages of negotiations. Another project,
CASA-1000, involves the construction of transmission lines to supply 1,000 megawatts of electricity
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from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and
Pakistan. In 2014, the WB earmarked about U.S.$500
million for the U.S.$1 billion-worth initiative. The
United States and Russia have both expressed a strong
interest in the projects, which would enhance their
leverage.
Despite their benefits, TAPI and CASA-1000 lack
private sector involvement and face security challenges. Afghanistan may see more instability after the U.S.
military withdrawal, while Pakistan will continue its
struggle with home-grown militant groups. Meanwhile, prevalent corruption and porous borders of the
regional states have facilitated trans-border drug trafficking and organized crime activity that many fear
will only rise. Still, the demand for these projects is
there, and Central Asia can help meet the energy demand in Asia, where gas and oil needs are expected
to grow by 22–27 percent between 2007 and 2035.14
The region’s contribution to Asia’s demand will help
meet the global energy demand, forecast to rise by 50
percent in the next 25 years.15
The integration into the global economic system for
the landlocked Central Asia cannot rely on the “hardware” (transit infrastructure) alone. Increasingly, it is
the “software” in the form of technical, political, and
financial components that parties need in order to facilitate intra- and inter-regional connectivity. Despite
challenges of intraregional cooperation, the regional
states have worked with the WB, IMF, ADB, EBRD,
the United States Agency for International Development, and the United Kingdom (UK) Department
for International Development, among others, to improve their policies in these areas. However, relatively
closed Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have underperformed. Turkmenistan is currently considering an
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entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), and
this could prompt Ashgabat to advance needed reforms sooner rather than later.16 Kyrgyzstan has long
been a WTO member, while Kazakhstan is actively
seeking membership in 2014-15 as well. Kazakhstan’s
Customs Union (CU) and Eurasian Economic Union
(EEU) membership may complicate its WTO aspirations (however, Russia, a CU member, became a WTO
member in 2013). In the case of South Asia, a proposed
trade and transit pact involving Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan as part of the Afghan-Pak trade
transit agreement would allow for more unimpeded
trade in the region. However, security risks threaten
its implementation, despite expected positive effects
of expanded trade within and between Central and
South Asia on stability in the broader region.
Global dynamics, the region’s immense natural
resources, as well as energy, trade, and transit corridors are all factors shrinking Central Asia’s connectivity gap and reflect the concurrent cooperation and
competition between major players over processes
and directions of Central Asia’s internal and external economic integration. While promising for Central Asia’s overall development, such trends are also
fraught with the potential for risks and collisions. As
Deputy Secretary of Kazakh Security Council Marat
Shaihutdinov stated:
The rivalry between projects of global players is intensifying, pushing our countries to so-called final
geopolitical choices. On the one hand, this leads to the
region [Central Asia] becoming an object of external
influence. On the other hand, it leads to a slow yet
dangerous increase in conflict potential.17
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Related dynamics thus call for more successful
performances by local economies in advancing their
connectivity processes and joint policies to enhance
regional economic integration in order to strengthen
their positions in the transcontinental and global
economies.
KAZAKHSTAN: REGIONAL ECONOMIC
LEADER KEEN ON GLOBAL INTEGRATION
Kazakhstan is considered the region’s leader in
terms of diversity and vastness of natural resources,
rapid pace of economic reforms, and development
policies seeking to integrate Kazakhstan within Central Asia and the global economy. In 2012, its gross
domestic product (GDP) stood at U.S.$235.6 billion,
exceeding the combined GDP of all other Central
Asian economies. Kazakhstan has displayed one of
the highest growth rates in the world over the last decade, in large part due to vast natural resources and
political stability that has helped it attract more than
U.S.$180 billion of foreign direct investment (FDI)
since independence. Kazakhstan ranks 11th and 14th
in the world in oil and gas reserves. It has 12 percent
of world’s uranium reserves, enabling it to become the
world’s largest uranium producer and supplier (about
37 percent). It also has huge reserves of tungsten, barite, copper, gold, iron ore, and zinc.18 The country’s
multivector foreign policy has enabled Kazakhstan to
pursue strategic cooperation with Russia and related
integration initiatives in the former Soviet space, allowing it to cultivate strategic partnerships with the
United States, the EU, China, and increasingly India.
Importantly, authorities aim to turn Kazakhstan into a
major Silk Road hub of transit, energy, and trade links
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in Eurasia as the country continues its efforts at regional and global integration as part of its ambitious
accelerated economic modernization program. Authorities plan the program will put Kazakhstan within
top 50 economies of the world by 2030.
While many tout Kazakhstan as the most successful Central Asian state that has managed to consolidate
itself as a viable state capable of demonstrating strong
results after nearly 2 decades since independence, its
success is not, and has not been, devoid of serious development challenges. Kazakhstan’s political arena
remains tight, leaving little room for the already marginalized opposition. Kazakh authorities adhere to the
concept of gradual development, whereby economic
rather political development takes a priority. Kazakhstan suffers from poor and unequal regional economic
development, with wealth concentrated in the capital
Astana in the north and the financial and former capital Almaty in the south. Its economy overly depends
on energy exports and suffers from prevalent corruption within government structures.
The impact of the global financial crisis on Kazakhstan, which had borrowed heavily from external markets, demonstrated the extent of Kazakhstan’s intentions to position itself as a small yet increasingly active
player in the global economy. But it also underscored
cases of mismanagement by authorities and the private sector, which were eager to capitalize on the relatively cheap yet poorly protected credit available on
international markets. The crisis caused serious economic challenges for Kazakhstan, whose effects percolated through Central Asia and South Caucasus, for
which Kazakhstan is a growing source of investment.
The labor unrest in the oil town of Zhanaozen in the
country’s western province in 2011, which led to the

75

government crackdown that left at least 14 killed, reveals the extent of unaddressed development issues.
Despite related pressures, Kazakhstan did not
close its economy to the outside world in response
to the global finance crisis, but opened up for more
FDI while gambling on accelerated modernization
of its resource-dependent economy. It has advanced
from 74th to 59th place among 183 economies in the
WB’s Ease of Doing Business report for 2011, though it
needs to do more to improve corporate governance,
the legal and regulatory environment, as well as to
develop better infrastructure and improve efficiency
of production.19 Authorities announced a number of
initiatives after the unrest in Zhanaozen to generate
cross-regional synergies, which they have sought to
link with the east-west and north-south geo-economic
dynamics driven by Kazakhstan’s growing trade,
energy, and transit ties with Russia, China, the EU,
and India. Kazakh leadership has repeatedly emphasized the importance of reviving the Silk Roads and
position Kazakhstan as its hub, especially after the
deleterious impact of the global crisis that exposed a
series of challenges with the country’s heavily energy
exports-dependent economy. But Kazakhstan first
needs to enhance its transit capacity. As President
Nazarbayev said:
Transport infrastructure is at the heart of industrial
economy and society. . . . I have said many times that
it is impossible to reach the level of a developed country without modern high-quality highways. As we
are located between Europe and Asia, between the
North and the South; transportation remains of great
importance to Kazakhstan. To set up a network of
internal roads, we have initiated the construction of
highways.20
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Kazakhstan’s 2013 transportation infrastructure
development plan earmarked more than U.S.$32 billion of public and private investment to upgrade and
build transportation and logistics infrastructure, a
move the authorities hope will lead to 1 percent increase in annual GDP growth and help Kazakhstan
move from 86th place on the WB’s Logistics Performance Index to 40th place.21
As part of its “infrastructure triad” plan, the government intends to turn its four largest cities—Astana
in the north, Almaty in the southeast, Shymkent in the
south, and Aktobe in the northwest—into regional development centers connecting major industrial zones.
It also envisions the construction of the new, 1,200km
long Zhezkazghan-Shalkar-Beineu railway by 2015,
linking the country’s west and east and connecting
Kazakhstan via the Caucasus to the EU and China’s
Lianyungang seaport on the Pacific Ocean. For 2014,
authorities had earmarked U.S.$18 billion to support
transport development, planning to upgrade up to 85
percent of national highways and 70 percent of local
roads. They also plan to increase the speed of internal
cargo transit via railways by 15–20 percent and external cargo transit by up to 20–30 percent, while aiming
to increase the volume of cargo transit to 25 million
tons and collect U.S.$1.5 billion in transit revenues
in 2015.
Kazakhstan aims to develop its logistics services
sector and use the territory of the EEU members, potentially also including Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
in the future, for transit and export of its goods via
north and south. To the west, it anticipates using the
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, due to start operating by
the end of 2014, to export its oil and grain, as well as
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expanding the port at Aktau and logistics center in
Aktobe as gateways to the west. To the south, it looks
to reap benefits of the recently constructed railway to
Turkmenistan and Iran, which enables an outlet to the
Persian Gulf.22 Furthermore, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have agreed to build the Caspian segment of the
Trans-Eurasian Information Super Highway, which
involves laying a fiber-optic cable linking major information exchange hubs in Europe and Asia.23
Geopolitically more significant is Kazakhstan’s
participation in the construction of the Western Europe–Western China transit corridor. Due by 2015,
the corridor is expected to raise Kazakhstan’s GDP
by 68 percent above the 2010 baseline and the GDP of
Central Asian countries by 43 percent, reducing transit times and transit costs via Kazakhstan by U.S.$230
million and create more than 30,000 jobs.24 The development of the Khorgos crossing at the border with
China into a Special Economic Zone with its own air,
ground, and railway infrastructure is another priority for Kazakhstan. It would link the Khorgos crossing with the Chinese financed high-speed railway line
connecting Astana and Almaty. Kazakhstan and China have considered investing U.S.$100 million into the
construction of the terminal infrastructure in China’s
Pacific port of Lianyungang to increase the volume
of transit traffic from 18 to 36 million tons of cargo
by 2020.
Kazakhstan has proved to be far more successful
than its neighbors in advancing its internal and external connectivity over the years. Its relative political
stability and economic dynamism have coalesced to
produce a positive impact on the country’s long-term
development. As it moves forward, Astana should
ponder the demands on the political system that are
likely to increase as the country’s population becomes
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wealthier and politically savvier. Externally, authorities should ensure that it continues to accompany its
deepening integration with Russia and Belarus as part
of the EEU with equally persistent and energized efforts to cultivate ties with China, India, the EU, and
the United States to boost its economic and political
development as a strong, sovereign states. In the process, it should involve its Central Asian neighbors
in multilateral initiatives to enhance integration and
expand the region’s connectivity with the world.
KYRGYZSTAN: FRAGILE ECONOMY WITH
STRONG RE-EXPORT POTENTIAL
Kyrgyzstan is politically the most open country
in the region, but has a relatively weak economy and
insignificant deposits of energy resources. It depends
heavily on remittances by hundreds of thousands of
laborers in Russia and exports of gold. Remittances
accounted for 31 percent of GDP in 2011, while gold
mining—for 10 percent of GDP, 60 percent of exports,
and 40 percent of industrial production, indicating the
lack of diverse production and export base. Its now
chronic political instability following two government
overthrows in the last 9 years and interethnic clashes
in 2010 hamper its internal and external development
efforts, though its economy showed signs of a recovery
in 2013, growing by 10.5 percent, largely as a result of
strong dynamics in gold exports.25 Kyrgyzstan has also
become the region’s re-export gateway for China’s expanding merchandise exports across Central Asia. Its
relatively open political environment and proximity
to China offer it immense development opportunities
as it seeks to become a hub on the China-led Silk Road
extending from China’s Xingjian and Afghanistan via
Central Asia to Iran and the Caspian.
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Kyrgyzstan’s political instability, viewed as a sign
of messy democratic development, has prevented the
country from attracting more FDI and maintaining a
steady economic course. Kyrgyzstan further has an
undiversified trade structure, making it vulnerable to
fluctuations in world commodity prices. It depends
heavily on foreign aid for much-needed infrastructure
and institutional development.26 Kyrgyzstan also underutilizes its advantages of WTO membership, failing to stimulate and diversify its predominant raw
materials-based exports in order to decrease an external trade balance, even if it became the first country in
the region to join WTO and open its economy to foreign markets. Kyrgyzstan has leaned on its Great Silk
Roads Doctrine since 1998, seeking to position itself
as a major hub between Europe and Asia but has not
achieved significant results.27 But this is changing, in
large part given the rise of China.
As an upstream country, Kyrgyzstan has major
yet heavily underutilized hydro energy capacity, but
financial challenges have prevented it from building
new infrastructure. The increased demand for electricity exports to South Asia may bring the needed
resources to expand the use of the hydro potential.
Kyrgyzstan also has significant gold and rare earth
metal reserves, vast deposits of nepheline, as well as
localized reserves of coal, oil, and gas.28 Energy resource wealth of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan
make Kyrgyzstan susceptible to leverage, prompting
Bishkek also to cultivate diverse economic ties with
other actors and implement reforms to speed up its
economic development and enhance its internal and
external connectivity.
In 2013, the administration of President Almazbek
Atambayev, who gained a 6-year term in 2011 in the
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country’s first peaceful transfer of power, adopted
a 5-year economic development strategy seeking to
implement economic reforms. Authorities planned to
spend U.S.$13 billion to double GDP in 5 years, drawing on aid and investment to finance agriculture, mining, transport, power and other sectors. The strategy
seeks to harness the region’s geo-economic and geopolitical trends to secure financial resources to expand
and integrate its economy into global markets by relying on China, Russia, and Kazakhstan, among others.
Possible failures by authorities and instability at home
or in the region could easily frustrate these efforts.29
Kyrgyzstan especially looks to neighboring China
to support its development strategy, aiming to expand
its transport infrastructure as well as manufacturing
and logistics centers at what are Central Asia’s largest trade markets at Dordoi and Kara-Suu in the north
and south. China’s expanding trade into Russia and
Europe goes through these markets, and Moscow’s efforts to enlist Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan into the CU
are not coincidental. The annual trade between Kyrgyzstan and China stands at about U.S.$5 billion, and
inclusion of Kyrgyzstan into the CU and EEU would
undermine Kyrgyzstan’s trade with China and its reexport potential.
Kyrgyzstan welcomed China-built oil refinery and
now considers China’s participation in the construction of the railway line linking China and Uzbekistan
via Kyrgyzstan; a proposed Kazakhstan-KyrgyzstanChina oil pipeline; and an envisioned gas pipeline
from Turkmenistan via the southern part of Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan views these projects as an opportunity to close the geographic and economic divides that
exist between the north and south of the country and
evolve as a crucial transit link for expanding trade and
energy flows throughout Eurasia.
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The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway is an
especially important project, but fear of China’s economic and, in the future, military expansion has impeded it. Still, Bishkek views this and other projects
with China as a means to balance Russia, especially
considering Kyrgyzstan’s relatively stronger political and military dependence on Moscow compared
to other Central Asian countries. At the same time,
it looks to Russia to do the same vis-à-vis China, as
evidenced by the interest of Kyrgyzstan to participate
in the proposed Indo-Siberian railway network linking the Urals and Siberia in Russia with Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and India. Kyrgyzstan would need to build a railway bridging the
more urbanized and industrialized north with the
more rural and agricultural south in order to participate in this project. The clashes between Uzbeks and
Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan’s southern city of Osh in 2010
reveal the importance of improving the connectivity
and between the country’s north and south.
The North-South and East-West transit initiatives
could help Kyrgyzstan integrate from within and
without, expanding its connectivity and prospects at
becoming a more viable state. This is important considering its relatively weak economy and fragile political stability, as well as favorable external dynamics
driven by the growing regional profiles of major powers that authorities in Kyrgyzstan should utilize more
effectively to boost domestic development by pursuing major internal reforms. Kyrgyzstan’s re-export
potential will remain dependent on the rise of China, though potential inclusion into the CU and EEU
threatens to undermine this role. The membership in
these bodies will enhance the country’s connectivity,
but it will be less multivector in scope, depriving Bishkek of prospects at developing ties with other actors.
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TAJIKISTAN: WEAK ECONOMY WITH LIMITED
SHORT-TERM INTEGRATION CAPACITY
Tajikistan’s economy is one of the weakest in the
region, heavily dependent on foreign aid and remittances from hundreds of thousands of migrants working in Russia. The economy suffers from prevalent
corruption, state interference, and excessive dependence on exports of aluminum. According to a WB report, remittances accounted for 47 percent of its GDP
in 2012, while aluminum made up 55 percent of all export revenues in 2011.30 Geopolitical challenges stemming from tensions with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan’s
own lack of resources in part explain the country’s political and military dependence on Russia. Tashkent
has in the past exercised leverage over Tajikistan in
the energy and transit spheres, prompting Dushanbe
to develop southern, western, and eastern vectors of
trade and transit links to break its relative isolation.
Tajikistan’s development challenges, such as inadequate economic linkages between regions and associated centrifugal dynamics, as well as its rigid political
system and proximity to unstable Afghanistan undermine the country’s development efforts. Meanwhile,
the increase in narco-trafficking from Afghanistan to
and via Tajikistan has questioned Tajikistan’s viability
as a state.
Tajikistan suffers from economic and political
divisions—in large part due to geopolitics—which
increase the prospects of separatism in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) in the southeast, Rasht Valley in central-north, and the Sughd
province in the north. In 2012, authorities launched
an offensive against a paramilitary group led by Tolib
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Ayombekov, an insurgent field commander during
the civil war in the 1990s, following the assassination
of the regional head of State National Security Committee. The group had former United Tajik Opposition
fighters within its ranks, who opposed current President Emomali Rahmon during the war and are based
in GBAO and the Rasht Valley. The clashes left more
than 60 people killed and led to popular protests by
residents demanding the withdrawal of military forces from the province. During the conflict, the group
reportedly had forces on standby across the border in
Afghanistan. The confrontation underscored the lack
of development in GBAO, the region’s distinct character, and its weak and uneasy relationship with central
authorities. Tajikistan is thus interested in advancing
internal linkages to thwart centrifugal forces within
the country.
As its neighbors, Tajikistan sees it crucial to revive the Great Silk Roads and seeks to capitalize on
a number of related initiatives to enhance its internal
and external integration. It aims to leverage its WTO
membership, gained in 2013, to liberalize its trade
regime and enhance its connectivity by participating
in Silk Road projects.31 In 2014, President Rakhmon
called for more active participation in global trade,
highlighting the need to break the country’s transport isolation while referring to the Dushanbe-Kulma
highway that links it with China and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan railway. But Tajikistan
needs to develop internal infrastructure capacity to
accommodate the projected increase in energy, trade,
and transit flows, a major challenge considering the
country’s terrain and the legacy of the war. According
to a 2011 ADB report, Tajikistan lost about 80 percent
of its transit infrastructure after independence.32
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Tajikistan’s strong but heavily underutilized hydroelectric potential, if developed, would enable the
country to play a major role as a regional integrator in
the electricity markets in Central and South Asia.33 Tajikistan is a major party to CASA-1000, which would
help it diversify its skewed export base, increase the
inflow of revenues, and rectify its energy deficit, while
facilitating cooperation within and between Central
and South Asia. However, this and other initiatives
face strong resistance from the neighboring Uzbekistan, which has in the past enforced a railway blockade on Tajikistan in an effort to impede its imports of
materials needed for the construction of water dams.
Downstream Uzbekistan views such projects, especially the Rogun project to build the world’s largest
dam, as threatening its economic security. Tajikistan,
in turn, considers them essential in contributing to its
energy security and development.
In South Asia, Tajikistan looks to Pakistan and India to break its relative isolation. Expectedly, pursuing multilateral cooperation with Tajikistan, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan is politically difficult, but
the steady progress on TAPI and CASA indicates it
is economically promising. Bilateral and multilateral
projects are thus bound to grow in importance, with
India likely to become a significant partner for Tajikistan if the Pakistani-Indian rapprochement becomes
a reality. Geography dictates that cooperation with
Afghanistan and Pakistan will be crucial if Tajikistan
wants to tap in the dynamism afforded by the current
and projected rise of India.
Just as Dushanbe in Central Asia, Islamabad seeks
to break its relative isolation in South Asia. Pakistan
does not have direct trade links with Central Asia or
beneficial trade deals with India. The Indo-Pakistani
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informal annual trade is about U.S.$2-3 billion, with
Pakistan accounting for less than 0.5 percent of India’s trade and India accounting for about 1 percent
of Pakistan’s trade. A normalization of their ties could
boost the joint trade by 20 times and open new vistas of inter-regional cooperation with countries in
Central Asia and the Middle East. Pakistan and India
are both wary of each other’s regional ambitions. As
China, Pakistan is concerned with attempts by India
to project its military influence in Tajikistan and wider
Central Asia, though Russia’s preponderant regional
security role has thus far impeded India’s related efforts.34 In 2013, Tajikistan agreed to extend the lease by
Russia of its military base in return for tariff-free fuel
supplies and privileges for hundreds of thousands of
Tajik migrants laboring in Russia.35
Pakistan offered to invest U.S.$600 million in the
Rogun dam in the early-1990s, but the investment did
not come due to the Tajik civil war. As of 2011, Tajikistan imported most of its cement for construction from
Pakistan, which then planned to create new enterprises in Tajikistan. Dushanbe and Islamabad further seek
to develop the north-eastern Afghan Wakhan corridor
linking Tajikistan, Pakistan, and China by constructing a road and a railway link between Pakistan and
Tajikistan to enhance inter-regional connectivity.
Backed by Afghanistan and Russia, the completion of
the project would provide Tajikistan and Russia with
access to Pakistani ports, the Arabian Sea, and the
Indian Ocean, expanding trade for Pakistan and Afghanistan in and via Central Asia into Russia. Given
the rise of China, linking the corridor to China via the
Karakorum highway makes this project geopolitically
significant as well.
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With the support from China and Iran, Tajikistan
gained access across the Pamir Mountains to Afghanistan via a U.S.-built bridge and plans to build a rail
line from Dushanbe to Afghanistan.36 Meanwhile, the
construction of a fifth bridge linking Tajikistan’s Khatlon Region with Afghanistan’s Khotlon Province is
expected to facilitate not only internal, but also intraregional and extraregional trade.37 Like Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan is also in dire need of developing its constrained air hub capacity by opening up the sector to
private market.38 India’s efforts to establish air traffic
connections with all Central Asian states provides an
opportunity for Tajikistan to seek support from Delhi
to facilitate the country’s southward connectivity.
Tajikistan will need to depend significantly on
outside actors to nurture and expand its economic
development and break its relative isolation in the region. The good news is many actors are interested in
expanding their own connectivity by using Tajikistan
as a springboard, including Iran, China, India, and
Pakistan. Dushanbe needs to harness external dynamics while promoting domestic political and economic
reforms to create synergies and boost its own development and connectivity with the wider region and
the global economy. This is imperative considering its
relatively weak economy, as well as its limited shortterm yet significant long-term potential to become a
major integrator, along with Afghanistan, of Central
and South Asia.
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UZBEKISTAN: RELATIVELY STRONG
PERFORMER WITH UNTAPPED
CONNECTIVITY POTENTIAL
Uzbekistan’s economy, while growing rapidly and
steadily over the last several years (forecast to grow at
6.9 percent in 2014), suffers from overwhelming state
control in several major sectors, prevalent corruption,
and weak rule of law. It displays significant inefficiencies due to the lack of private markets and trade diversification, as well as ineffective state planning. Gold,
uranium, oil, gas, and cotton dominate the country’s
exports. Uzbekistan’s location, its abundant natural resources, a relatively more developed railway system,
and a higher level of industrialization could lead to a
much more successful economic performance. However, heavy state control and authoritarian political
system, touted as they are in the country for ensuring
stability, hamper Uzbekistan’s development efforts
and its potential to serve as a major regional economic
player on par with Kazakhstan. A popular joke that it
was not Uzbekistan that left the Soviet Union but the
other way around indicates development challenges
under the President Islam Karimov-led regime. These
issues will continue despite looming generational
change, given the age of the president.39 As it considers participating in major transcontinental projects,
Uzbekistan will increasingly face the challenge of
reconciling its needs for internal security and
liberalization.40
Uzbekistan is the world’s seventh largest gold producer (though gold mining remains underdeveloped)
and third largest cotton exporter, pursuing especially
close trade ties with Russia, Turkey, China, and Kazakhstan.41 Uzbekistan has about 100 types of miner-
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als, with its mineral potential estimated at U.S.$3.3
trillion. With U.S.$5 trillion cubic meters worth of
natural gas reserves, it is also the world’s 10th largest
gas producer. A number of Japanese companies are
active in the country’s energy industry, developing oil
and gas reserves at Ustyurt, Bukhara, Khiva, SouthWest Gisar, Surhandarya, and Fergana regions.42 State
company Uzbekneftegaz and Russian Lukoil, in turn,
participate in the Kandym–Khausak–Shady–Kungrad
Project to develop gas fields, the initiative backed by
the ADB, IDB, and the Korean Development Bank,
among others. Uzbekistan has sought to develop new
oil and gas pipelines, having in its network 868km of
oil and 9,594km of gas pipelines as of 2006. Uzbekistan further ranked seventh in the world in the production of uranium in 2011, but this sector remains
underdeveloped.43
Despite its resource wealth, a lack of FDI and weak
transportation infrastructure have prevented Uzbekistan from becoming a major gas exporter and a major
base in the region for multinationals that have found
more comfort in the relatively open Kazakhstan. While
it has seen growing levels of FDI over the last years,
particularly from Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan,
India, Pakistan, China, South Korea, Japan, Germany,
and Ukraine, Uzbekistan continues to suffer from relatively low FDI inflows, displaying the lowest foreign
investment rates per capita in the CIS and showing
an estimated net FDI at 2.09 percent of GDP in 2010.
To expand FDI inflows and technology transfers, authorities built special industrial zones at Navoi and
Angren.44
One cannot imagine the development of the
broader region without a more active engagement by
Uzbekistan, which borders all Central Asian states
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and Afghanistan. Uzbekistan forms part of the TransCaspian railroad, a legacy of the Russian Empire enabling the connection between the Caspian Sea, on the
one hand and Kazakhstan and Russia, on the other.
Despite being wary of regional and multilateral initiatives, Uzbekistan has made strides in the development of domestic transit infrastructure (such as the
Guzar-Boysun-Kumkurgan highway in the south) and
expanded cooperation with Afghanistan by building
rail links to the country that needs Central Asian markets to improve its stability. In 2010, ADB helped Uzbekistan finance the construction of a railway linking
Hairaton with Mazar-i Sharif in Afghanistan. CAREC
plans to assist Uzbekistan with extending the line by
230km—a U.S.$450 million-worth initiative—to ensure connection with an Afghan-Tajik border point at
Sher Khan Bandar on the Pyanj River.45
Uzbekistan is also interested in the proposed
Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China railway project. The
railway would run from Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang
via Kara-Suu in Kyrgyzstan to Andijan in Uzbekistan,
potentially going as far as Europe through Turkey
and significantly boosting Uzbek economy by offering new trade partners and business opportunities.
However, the uncertain prospects of the line development in Kyrgyzstan may frustrate Tashkent’s hopes.
Importantly, the Uzbek government issued a decree
on July 11, 2014 outlining measures that would facilitate the country’s plans to join the WTO, though a lack
and slow pace of economic and political reforms will
prevent it from achieving that goal sooner.
Overall, Uzbekistan’s geopolitical position offers it
significant opportunities to expand its internal and external connectivity, provided it opens up its political
and economic system. Doing so will allow the leader-
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ship to tap in the country’s central location, immense
wealth and dynamism of its population—the region’s
largest—to serve as a regional and inter-regional integrating force. Uzbekistan should seriously consider
Kazakhstan’s experience in opening up its economic
system and accompanying it with necessary reforms
to boost its connectivity.
TURKMENISTAN: CLOSED, STATE-DOMINATE
ECONOMY WITH STRONG ENERGY EXPORT
CAPACITY
The Turkmen government wields pervasive control in all domains of the country, including the economy. Turkmenistan has opened up considerably since
the death of former President Saparmurat Niyazov
and has recently announced its intention to join the
WTO. But the current administration led by President
Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov needs to do significantly more to open up the economy and the political
system. Despite a steady and fast economic growth
rate averaging more than 5 percent over the years,
its economy has remained heavily dependent on gas
and cotton exports and suffered from issues similar
to those in Uzbekistan. A closed and tight political
system, excessive state control, prevalent corruption,
weak rule of law, and proclaimed neutrality in international relations have prevented Turkmenistan from
becoming a magnet of FDI and an active regional player. According to the WB, its FDI is much lower than
that of Kazakhstan, though it did rise rapidly from
about U.S.$418.2 million in 2005 to about U.S.$2 billion in 2010.46 Turkmenistan’s agricultural sector (the
country is among the world’s top 10 cotton producers)
employs 50 percent of the labor force and produces
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more than 60 percent of the country’s GDP, leaving a
lot of room for industrialization and urbanization as it
seeks to expand its national economy.
The country’s substantial gas reserves have enabled it to play a major role in regional energy markets, prompting Ashgabat to pursue diversification
of its export routes to alleviate geopolitical pressures
that stem from Russia’s traditional yet waning grip on
the country’s energy production and exports, expanding its external connectivity significantly.47 Turkmenistan further ranks sixth in global gas reserves and 20th
in gas production, though some estimates suggest the
country’s gas reserves are the fourth rather than the
sixth-largest in the world.48 After a 2009 dispute with
Russia over gas exports, Turkmenistan embarked on
diversification of its export routes. By 2011, it had exported 14.3bcm to China, 10.2bcm to Iran and 10.1bcm
to Russia, a notable achievement considering its pre2009 annual exports to Russia totaling 40bcm. It now
aims to export up to 65bcm of gas to China by 2016. It
relies on a number of existing and planned pipelines in
the region to expand its exports and external connectivity, especially given the growing energy demand in
the EU, China, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
It supplies gas to Russia and Iran via the Central
Asia-Centre and Bukhara-Urals pipelines and the
Korpezhe-Kurt Kui pipeline, respectively. In 2010,
with its partners, it launched the Dovletabad-SarakhsKhangiran pipeline to Iran and the Central Asia-China
pipeline linking it with China’s East-West pipeline. It
now pursues an East-West pipeline linking its eastern
gas fields to the Caspian Sea to supply up to 30bcm of
gas to markets in Europe annually starting in 2015 and
the TAPI pipeline to supply similar amount of gas. The
United States has supported Turkmenistan’s efforts to
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diversify gas export routes and backed the proposed
TAPI and Trans-Caspian initiatives, which face major
financial, transit, and geopolitical challenges.49
Turkmenistan also seeks to improve transit infrastructure within the country and with its neighbors by
pursing upgrades and new connections. In 2013, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan began operating a new railway connecting the energy-rich regions of both countries. The link, which is 540 miles long, connects Ozen
in Kazakhstan with Etrek in Turkmenistan through
Uzbekistan; the parties plan to extend it to the Iranian
rail network.50 It also participates in the construction of the railway linking it with Afghanistan and
Tajikistan. Turkmenistan is also building roads and
railroads connecting it with the Afghan Ring Road, a
crucial initiative considering the underdeveloped rail
linkages within and with Afghanistan.
As any other regional state, Turkmenistan has a
lot of room and need for expanding its connectivity.
It needs to liberalize its economic and political system
to promote greater efficiencies in economic development and trade. The country’s success in diversifying
its energy exports over the last years suggests the existence of skills that authorities should apply in other
economic areas to boost the country’s potential for
internal and external economic integration.
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CHAPTER 4
REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC DYNAMICS
CONSTRAINING CENTRAL ASIA’S
CONNECTIVITY
Where there is ruin, there is hope for a treasure.
Rumi1

MAJOR TECHNICAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL,
AND SECURITY CHALLENGES
Despite the fast-developing trade, energy, and
transit infrastructure within and between Central and
South Asia driven by the dynamism of neighboring
economies and, to a lesser extent, the local economies
themselves, the regional countries lag in global connectedness. Their landlocked status and major technical, economic, and political challenges constrain
their global market access and international trade
flows, impeding the region’s internal and external
connectivity.

Figure 4-1. Global Market Access.
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The “modern activity gap” concept (see Figure
4-2) underscores the lack of information connectivity
to the global communication flows in the late-1990s
for the region comprising parts of Central and South
Asia and extending from the Black Coast to China’s
Xingjian. Each dot represents overhead satellite intercepts of all types of communications in a 24-hour period in the late-1990s.2 This picture has changed over
the last 15 years, especially given the fast development of Internet, migration patterns and concomitant
need to maintain connections with the region, among
other factors. But it also reveals a low starting position of Central Asia in terms of its information connectivity and, perhaps more importantly, given the lack
of overall development in the region, in terms of its
economic linkages with the global economy.

Figure 4-2. Communications
in the Globalized World.
The DHL’s 2012 Global Connectedness Index,
which measures the global connectedness of 140
countries based on the depth and breadth of coun-
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tries’ trade, capital, information and people flows,
shows that South and Central Asia as a broader region is behind across almost all parameters, ranking last on depth and third from last on breadth. Its
higher breadth (connectedness with countries outside
the region) than depth (connectedness with countries
within the region) reveals low levels of intraregional
integration due to tensions between India and Pakistan in South Asia, as well as interstate tensions over
border, water, and energy issues in Central Asia. In the
period 2005–11, the broader region displayed the lowest proportion of intraregional merchandise exports,
standing at just 7 percent. Less than 15 percent of international flows are intraregional, indicating deeper
connections to countries outside the broader region.3
In 2012, intraregional trade in Central Asia reached
only U.S.$3 billion, which represents 6.2 percent of
total imports, revealing the importance of developing
open markets and trade routes in the region.4 According to the 2005 United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), the potential benefits of effective regional
cooperation for Central Asian states could lead to a
possible doubling of regional gross domestic product
(GDP) over 10 years.5
Kazakhstan ranks 54th in global connectedness,
making it the top-ranked country among 12 countries
in the broader region of Central and South Asia. It
ranks strong on the capital pillar (28th out of 122 countries on depth and 17th out of 67 on breadth) and on the
people flows pillar (25th out of 116). Kyrgyzstan ranks
124th on the global connectedness and 10th among
the 12 states in Central and South Asia. Its depth of
trade, particularly trade in services, is notably high,
positioning the country as 17th globally for services
exports depth and 10th for services imports depth. In
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the region, it ranks 1st on both services exports and
imports depth. Tajikistan ranks 132 in global connectedness and 11th in the broader region. It also ranks
30th out of 139 on the depth of its outward migration
and 40th out of 140 countries on the depth of merchandise imports. Uzbekistan ranks 123rd in global connectedness and 9th in the region. On the people pillar,
it ranks deepest, at 73rd out of 116 countries, due to
high migration and international student flows. Its
lowest depth rank is on the information pillar, where
it stands 128 out of 140 countries.6
These statistics are relevant for the broader region
of Central and South Asia in one important respect as
we ponder Central Asia’s shrinking connectivity gap:
the DHL’s Index shows that, following the financial
crisis that made the world less global, most international flows today occur within rather than between
regions. The poor state of intraregional trade ties in
Central and South Asia significantly hampers their
connectivity. But the index also reveals that enhancing global connectedness may bring trillions of dollars
in gains and that even the most connected economies
stand to benefit due to their predominantly domestic
activities.
A series of technical, economic, and political challenges help explain the dynamics. Technical issues include excessive duties, corruption, poor cooperation
on trade facilitation (customs, border crossings, poor
logistics, and other related inefficiencies), varying
migration rules, and lack of harmonization that stifle
intra- and inter-regional trade. An Asian Development Bank (ADB) survey of almost 1,000 truck drivers
hauling goods across Afghanistan overwhelmingly
suggests that bureaucracy is the major impediment to
trade.7 For instance, in one particular route that stretch-
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es from Tajikistan to Russia across all Central Asian
countries but Turkmenistan, 35 percent of costs went
to unofficial payments, and 5 out of the 8 days the trip
took were spent waiting at checkpoints. Central Asia
Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) estimates
that trade facilitation improvements could result in
the annual growth of the overall economy of its members, including Xingjian but not the rest of China, by
8.1 percent and reach U.S.$351 billion by 2018. Besides
improving “software,” the regional countries would
need to upgrade existing and develop new transit corridors. The legacy of the Soviet transport infrastructure is still there, but it ensured connectivity within
the union and not much with neighbors outside the
union. To become an effective and efficient transit hub,
Central Asia countries would need to improve regional infrastructure by investing U.S.$2-3 billion annually to carry out needed upgrades, according to ADB.8
Investment in transit infrastructure, standardization,
and professionalization of customs agencies, with assistance from development institutions, is crucial for
reducing corruption, promoting private investment,
and allowing regional economies to compete better
with other fast-developing transcontinental routes.
The landlocked status of regional countries, technical challenges, and lack of general economic prospects
should prompt intraregional cooperation to remove
related impediments, but the economic and political
issues plaguing the region help explain the lack of
progress on this front. Of all regional countries, only
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have shown a particularly strong desire to integrate with the global economy by supporting economic and trade liberalization.
While the gas-rich Turkmenistan, like Kazakhstan, is
now ranked as a middle-income country, its economy
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is suffering from tight state control, a situation similar
to Uzbekistan where the regime perceives economic
liberation as a menace to political stability. Tajikistan,
in turn, has struggled with economic recovery following the civil war in the 1900s and is yet to show significant progress in a wide range of areas, including trade
liberalization. Collectively, the regional countries
have failed to pursue meaningful regional economic
cooperation and continued emphasizing their extraregional orientation.9
Despite poor regional cooperation, the countries’
extraregional ties are advancing their external connectivity, albeit on a slower and shallower levels. Slow
economic reforms, underdeveloped financial sectors,
remoteness from world markets, and challenging
geopolitical conditions have prevented the countries’
from enhancing their regional and global connectivity.
Authoritarian political systems have undermined
related prospects as well. This is despite the risks to
stability of local regimes stemming from potential
public discontent or unrest as a result of poor socioeconomic conditions amid the perceived flowering
of other economies. Regional elites are guardians of
their power and newly gained independence which,
understandable as it is, has constrained economic and
political liberalization. Poor governance, ineffective
state institutions, lack of public accountability, and
transparency have strongly impeded internal and
regional development and cooperation. Widespread
corruption and lack of economic diversification are in
large part the result of the infamous “resource-curse,”
which undermines public governance and sustainable
development in Central Asian countries. Meanwhile,
the expanded drug trade, as an outcome of the war
in Afghanistan, has undermined public health, state
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institutions, and entrenched the already prevalent
corruption in the region.
Simmering conflicts over water, energy, and border issues, especially in the Fergana Valley, the rivalry
over regional leadership between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan’s neutrality bordering on
isolation have significantly hampered the region’s internal and external connectivity. Astana and Tashkent
pulled out of the regional electricity grid, straining
ties with Dushanbe and Bishkek, which rely on winter
supplies of power from the downstream Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan. The latter, in turn, seek to mitigate
their dependence on water resources of the upstream
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.10 This has undermined
prospects for developing a regional energy market.
Tajikistan’s efforts to build the world’s largest dam,
Rogun, to rectify its energy deficit have met fierce resistance from Uzbekistan, which has resorted to border closures, energy blackmail, and even amassing of
troops close to Tajik borders to pressure Dushanbe to
rescind the project. Tashkent fears the dam will undermine the country’s cotton-based agriculture, cause
environmental degradation, and deprive it of leverage, while Tajikistan relies on the project to reduce
dependence on energy imports from Uzbekistan. 11
Such tensions are a daily part of life, just as frequent territorial disputes in the Fergana Valley involving an occasional use of arms fire by border guards.
According to Kyrgyz authorities, 80 border clashes
occurred between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan from
2009 to mid-2011.12 In early-2014, a dispute over Kyrgyzstan’s plans to build a road bypassing a Tajik enclave in southern Kyrgyzstan prompted the exchange
of fire by border guards of both countries. Persistent
distrust and weak state institutions often not account-
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able to citizens makes it hard to address related issues,
prompting the need for external involvement that can
also serve as a negative factor by exacerbating rivalries among outside powers for regional influence.13
For instance, Russia has used its predominant
military and political influence in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as its plans to invest in the countries’
hydro sectors, to apply pressure on Uzbekistan which
has resisted Moscow’s efforts at perceived domination.14 In 2009, Moscow sought to take advantage of
strained Uzbek-Kyrgyz ties and open a military base
in Osh, prompting Tashkent to turn to Washington.
The Kyrgyz government asked for a base in Batken,
located in the region that is home to Uzbek enclaves.
Having a base in Batken would allow Bishkek to keep
Tashkent in check, given occasional territorial disputes
with Uzbekistan. The United States offered Kyrgyzstan to set up a military training center in Batken, but
ultimately neither the center nor the Russian military
facilities were built in either Osh or Batken regions.15
The risk of conflicts induced internally or externally persists in the energy-rich Caspian, which is seeing growing militarization. The unresolved status of
the Caspian Sea has exacerbated the regional security
environment, stifling foreign direct investment (FDI)
and development of the region’s vast, yet contested
resources. The related developments have negatively
affected efforts of Central Asian states to build west
and south energy, trade, and transit connections, undermining as they are the prospects of the proposed
trans-Caspian gas pipeline connecting Turkmenistan’s
gas fields to Europe.16 Moreover, recurrent clashes between Turkic Uyghurs and Han Chinese in Xingjian—
notably in 1990, 2009, and 2013—are a testament to
the instability of China’s western frontier bordering

106

the formerly Soviet Central Asia.17 The perceived lack
of regional stability has prompted concerns about the
risks posed to the rapidly expanding trade between
China and Central Asian countries, though China’s
rapid pace of development and its expanding trade
westward via Xingjian through Central Asia is likely
to solidify Beijing’s hold on the region while spurring
a wider regional economic development conducive to
long-term stability.
The region’s lack of environmental security; regular droughts; and risks of water, energy, and food
crisis in the context of global warming and related
impacts may threaten Central Asia’s glacier system
and negatively affect water supply for irrigation
and hydro energy use. As the Eurasia Development
Bank concluded in a report in 2009, shortages of water and electric power would undermine the regional
economic development and could trigger interstate
conflicts.18 Together, environmental, as well as security chal-lenges in the Fergana Valley, the Caspian,
Xingjian, and Afghanistan, threaten Central Asia stability within and along the region’s perimeter, putting
the region’s shrinking connectivity process under risk
and hampering FDI and economic development that
underpin its external connectivity. Only by pursuing
stronger regional integration would Central Asian
states be able to withstand related pressures and enhance their connectivity prospects—an imperative
they have yet to materialize.
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STALLED INTRAREGIONAL INTEGRATION
PROCESSES IN CENTRAL ASIA
More than 20 years after they gained independence, Central Asian countries continue to fear not
only the agendas of outside powers, but also those of
each other. This is despite a wide range of common
challenges requiring joint efforts by the regional states
to consolidate their sovereignty, ensure regional security, and pursue more effective regional and global
economic integration.19
Several developments have impeded regional economic integration. The Central Asian states display
varying paces of economic and political development,
being torn as they are by conflicting models of development and integration promoted by Russia and China, among others.20 Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have
been far more successful in advancing political and
economic modernization compared to Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan’s economy
is larger than the economies of all the regional countries combined, standing at U.S.$216.4 billion in 2001
compared to the region’s second largest economy of
Uzbekistan standing at U.S.$94.04 billion. Kazakhstan
boasts a relatively high level of development, ranking
68th in a 2011 UN report on human development. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan
rank 115th, 126th, 127th, and 102nd, respectively.21 Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are large energy producers and exporters, while Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan are large importers of energy resources and
exporters of migrants. Kazakhstan has become a magnet for migrants of other regional countries, though
a regional migration policy in Central Asia does not
exist.22 Fostering political and economic liberalization
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would ensure a more effective and rapid domestic development of Central Asian economies, intraregional
cooperation, and external connectivity.
The Central Asian states are also in the process of
consolidating their newly gained sovereignties, displaying a strong sense of nationalism and resistance
to integration initiatives, either intra- or extraregional.
Ideologies that support their national building efforts
often conflict. But given their weak economic and security positions, as well as lack of other choices save
for stronger regional integration, they continue pursuing ties within outside powers and regional organizations led by Russia (Collective Security Treaty Organization [CSTO]; Commonwealth of Independent
States [CIS]; the Customs Union [CU]; and Eurasian
Economic Union [EEU]) and China (SCO). Functions
of these structures overlap and are often ineffective,
while relatively weak positions of Central Asian
states prevents them from influencing these institutions. Furthermore, Moscow and Beijing favor bilateral approach to dealings with the regional countries,
hampering regional cooperation efforts. Lack of commitment by leaders, funding, and involvement of the
private sector and civil society have impeded regional
integration as well.23 Expectedly, the lack of intraregional cooperation by Central Asian states themselves
opens room for manipulative involvement by outside
powers, depriving them of mechanisms to better manage their internal and external ties. While relations
with Russia and China help advance the region’s connectivity, an integrated region would ensure a more
effective and secure way of pursuing it and ensuring
that any push for connectivity advanced by an outside
power is not imposed or one-directional.
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To be sure, the regional states made an effort to
pursue intraregional cooperation. They first created
the Central Asian Commonwealth, transforming it
into the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC)
in mid-1990s. In 2001, the CAEC became the Central
Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), but the
CACO ceased to exist in the 2000s. Meanwhile, efforts
to pursue intraregional security cooperation have led
nowhere, with the regional states relying primarily on
external military and security cooperation with major
powers (Russia-led CSTO, China-led SCO, the U.S.led North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and
NATO’s Partnership for Peace [PfP] program, and the
European Union’s [EU] Border Management Program
for Central Asia). The Centrazbat, created on the basis of the CAEC in 1990s to coordinate joint military
exercises, held common exercises with NATO units
between 1997 and 2000, but had not evolved into an
effective military integration initiative.24 Even security
challenges stemming from the conflict in Afghanistan
have not advanced intraregional, integrated policies.
While participation in the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) has been a notable achievement, it has
been advanced through participation of the United
States and other external parties.
Enhancing intraregional cooperation would advance Central Asia’s position in the global economy,
but the regional states need to integrate internally to
create synergies when integrating externally. As President Nursultan Nazarbaev cautions:
We witness a clear rivalry of great powers over economic domination of the region. We are now poised
with a choice: we eternally remain the source of raw
materials for the world economy and wait for the coming of the next empire, or engage in serious integration
of Central Asia.25
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As the strongest regional actors, Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan could drive the regional integration, but
they need to overcome their rivalries. Uzbekistan further needs to expand its vision of its potential in the
age of globalization.
The rivalry between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan
over primacy in the region and their colliding domestic, regional, and global visions hamper intraregional
integration, with Kazakhstan looking to geo-economic
statecraft while Uzbekistan leaning more on geopolitics toolkit in their world views and approaches.
While Kazakhstan is the region’s largest economy by
far, Uzbekistan is the most-populated, centrally located, and borders all Central Asian states, while being
seen as the core of the region’s cultural and historical
heritage.26 Kazakhstan has a persistent record of integration initiatives, positioning itself as the country
with a multivector policy and global vision for itself
and the region. Uzbekistan, in turn, has long pursued
an isolationist course and refrained from intraregional
cooperation in a number of areas.
Pointedly, Kazakhstan did not close its economy
to the outside world in response to the global financial
crisis, but instead chose to open up for more FDI while
pursuing more stringent regulations to avoid financial
risks. It has displayed impressive economic growth in
recent years, accounting for about 50 percent of the
region’s GDP and attracting up to 85 percent of total
FDI since independence. The state dominated economies of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, however, have
failed to implement reforms and attracted the lowest
FDI in the region in relative terms.27
Uzbekistan had seen a good start as a proponent of
regional integration in the 1990s, calling for a regional
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security conference, advancing the Nuclear Weapon
Free Zone in the region, and initiating the 6+2 format of negotiations on stabilization of Afghanistan in
1998. However, the history of colonial legacy, rivalries
among great powers, uncertainties after the demise of
the Soviet Union, as well as risks of instability in Afghanistan have prompted it to rely more on bilateral
rather than multilateral ties.28 In 2005, President Islam
Abduganievich Karimov stated that “strategic uncertainty remains in the region. Geostrategic interests of
major world powers and our neighboring countries
concentrate and sometime collide in this part of the
world.” For instance, just as any other outside actor,
Russia has used the instability in Afghanistan as a
way to influence its relationship with Central Asian
states, providing significant economic and military
aid to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, yet being unable to
find a cooperative partner in Uzbekistan.
In 2008, Tashkent launched the “6+3” format of
talks on advancing security in Afghanistan and the
wider region, but proved unable to get international
support, re-entering CSTO in 2006 and leaving it
again in 2012. In another instance, it became a Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) member in
2006 but left in 2007. Since its independence, it left the
CSTO, EurAsEC, and CACO. It also disengaged from
the Istanbul process on Afghanistan and UN Special
Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) project, choosing to remain a SCO member to balance Russia and, increasingly, China’s own growing
economic clout in Central Asia. As analyst Farkhod
Tolipov put it, the country’s policy “has undergone
evolution from promising start in the 1990’s, through
uncertainty in the 2000’s, up to isolationism and stagnation today,” undermining prospects at regional in-
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tegration. Its 2012 foreign policy concept emphasized
its preference for bilateral ties and objection to the deployment of foreign bases in Uzbekistan, membership
in any military alliance, and involvement of outside
powers in the resolution of regional conflicts.29 All
Central Asian states distrust Moscow and its regional
initiatives, but it is Uzbekistan that has shown its ability to resist them, a position different from Kazakhstan that borders Russia and finds it more beneficial
to pursue integration with Moscow in various areas.
The political, security, and economic components
of Uzbekistan’s grand strategy contrast sharply with
those of Kazakhstan, which is a member of all major
post-Soviet integration initiatives and has successfully
exploited its growing ties with China, Russia, and the
United States at the same time. Astana’s ambitious
plans to integrate into wider global economic network
hold an extraordinary potential to better bridge Central Asia with the rest of the world and exert a positive
impact on the development of the region’s relatively
less open and successful economies. This, of course,
would be impossible without the development of intra- and inter-regional infrastructure in the areas of
energy, trade, and transit, among others.30 Regional
economic integration would entail common customs,
labor, economic, and security policies, especially considering the process of globalization that intensifies
competition. While achieving this is difficult, starting with common transit and trade policies would be
feasible.31
In 2012, Kazakhstan suggested launching a common free trade zone in Central Asia for the region to
become “a global center.” This initiative came on the
heels of an earlier proposed Union of Central Asian
States (UCAS), which would evolve as a node of global

113

energy security, uninterrupted trade flows, and continental stability. Despite Kazakhstan’s efforts, the initiative has failed to gain traction due to poor interstate
cooperation. In but one example, even a trade dispute
between relatively more cooperative Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan, threatens to delay Kazakhstan’ entry
into the World Trade Organization (WTO).32 Lack of
intraregional cooperation is a disconcerting development. As President Nazarbaev stated, “the destiny of
all Central Asian peoples depends on this most important factor—whether we can become a transportation route of global significance or will be pushed off
to the side of the road again.”33 A common free trade
zone may offer such a platform because the regional
states may view the UCAS initiative as premature.
The regional market is about 56 million people, with
regional economies sharing energy, transit, and irrigation links, on which to expand the internal and
external integration.
Kazakhstan also initiated the creation of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia in the 1990s to boost cooperation among
countries in an area stretching from the Middle East
to East Asia to advance security in Asia. This body,
in which the United States and Japan are observers, is
crucial given the lack of security cooperation mechanisms in Asia, which is seeing rapid development and
militarization. Astana thus has a record of viable regional and continental economic and security integration initiatives.
Promoting integration in Central Asia is a crucial
task, one that requires not only a much deeper and
visionary relationship between Astana and Tashkent,
but also Uzbekistan’s willingness to pursue domestic
reforms to unleash its untapped potential and culti-
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vate a more cooperative stance toward regional integration projects and dynamics. Achieving this will
go a long way toward enhancing intra- and extraregional connectivity, especially given the geopolitical
position of Uzbekistan and its proximity to Afghanistan, whose uncertain future threatens to undermine
Kabul’s potential role as a transcontinental integrator.
AFGHANISTAN POST 2014: UNCERTAIN
FUTURE OF TRANSCONTINENTAL
INTEGRATOR
Afghanistan served and could serve as a major
transcontinental and inter-regional integrator of Central and South Asia. But despite its promising potential, it confronts a series of geopolitical and security
challenges that make its national development and
the expansion of inter-regional economic ties highly
problematic, albeit increasingly relevant and crucial
in order to ensure the broader region’s connectivity to
the global economy and its viability as an integrated
unit. This suggests a particular importance attached
by Kabul, neighbors, and distant partners to the goal
of developing and reconnecting Afghanistan to the
expanding network of transcontinental trade.
The security situation in Afghanistan is far from
stable and is expected to get worse as coalition forces
seek to withdraw fully in 2016. It is placing Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan under significant security risks in the form of possible
increase in drug trafficking, terrorism, cross-border
crime, and even the potential to spark conflicts within
Tajikistan, which continues to suffer from the legacy
of its civil war and ties to groups in Afghanistan.34
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The implications of the political transition in Afghanistan after the presidential election in spring of
2014 and the withdrawal of coalition troops by the
end of the year are therefore all more significant. Taliban continue to stage frequent attacks across Afghanistan, including Kabul, and, with the likely support of
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, may come back
to the political scene in some form or another.35 Professor Steven Metz noted related challenges this way:
I simply cannot imagine a situation where the Karzai
government defeats the Taliban, imposes stability over
all of Afghanistan and builds an economy capable of
sustaining Afghanistan’s population growth (which is
one of the highest on earth) and supporting a massive
security force (or finding other employment for the
hundreds of thousands of members of the police and
army).36

The return of the Taliban to power or civil war and
continued insecurity would endanger the prospects
of Afghanistan and Central Asia serving as transcontinental hubs, undermining their expanding external
connectivity. A civil war in Afghanistan would again
put the country’s development back, potentially
leading to military intervention by powers within
or outside the region. The U.S. military presence has
played a crucial role in opening Afghanistan and Central Asia to South Asia and the global economy. But
its military withdrawal from Afghanistan without a
sustainable regional strategy in its wake threatens to
undercut Washington’s policy, active since 2006, of
reconnecting Central and South Asia to enhance their
connectivity.
The uncertainty about Afghanistan’s future, the
lack of multilateral stabilization initiatives, and prev-
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alent distrust by Kabul of Pakistan’s policies further
complicate the regional security situation.37 However,
some believe that Central Asian states and their cooperation with Russia, the United States, the EU, China,
and India will enable them to prevent cross-border
militancy that occurred in the region’s southern perimeter in the late-1990s and early-2000s. Others suggest that Afghanistan, even under the Taliban, would
have no choice but to expand its role of an inter-regional integrator as the country’s budget would be
unsustainable without expanding the economy via
trade, investment, and economic integration within
the broader region.38
This is in part why the United States has relied on
its New Silk Road Strategy (NSRS) to substitute its
military strategy with an initiative based more on economics as it prepares to disengage military from Afghanistan. The NSRS calls for integrating the economy
of Afghanistan with Central and South Asia and making Kabul a hub of inter-regional economic integration
and flows. However, the NSRS suffers from numerous
impracticalities, including the lack of funding, organization, and commitment to specific projects, as well as
limited U.S. regional economic presence.
Despite legitimate criticism, the NSRS feeds into
2008 Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy,
which seeks to restore Afghanistan’s role as a major
inter-regional hub:
Afghanistan is a country with significant potential for
economic development. It has substantial water, agricultural and mineral resources and is well positioned
to become a trade and business hub linking the markets of Central Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, and
China. The potential exists for sustainable economic
growth in the future. Afghanistan’s commercial con-
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nections to regional and global economies were severely disrupted and must be redeveloped. The development of a competitive private sector will depend on
establishing access to foreign markets and developing
viable export activities.39

This is where Central and South Asian economies
come in, as Afghanistan’s trade with Central Asia
in 2010 represented a meager 7 percent of its overall
trade,40 while its trade with Pakistan and India has an
enormous, untapped potential. Afghanistan also has
major reserves of natural resources. Afghanistan and
India have already agreed to mine an estimated 1.8
billion tons of iron, while China obtained rights to develop Afghanistan’s Aynak copper mine reserves. In
2012, Kabul issued four tenders in copper and gold in
an effort to promote its Silk Road initiative.41
In 2013, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan
agreed to build a new railway linking Akina-Andkhoy, Atamurat-Ymamnazar, and Pyandzh to bolster
economic ties of the three countries. Opening of the
Amu Darya bridge in 2007 was, in turn, critical for expanding trade between Afghanistan and Tajikistan.42
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan now expect to
sign a trade and transit pact as part of the 2010 AfghanPak trade and transit agreement, facilitating trilateral
trade in the geopolitically tense region. However, the
deal faces political impediments, despite its potential to improve relations between and within Central
and South Asia.43 Kazakhstan, which does not border
Afghanistan, has committed U.S.$8 million in development assistance, while Uzbekistan has assisted with
installation of fiber optic cables linking Afghanistan
to global networks.44 Uzbekistan has also become a
major supplier of electricity to Afghanistan since 2009
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and promoted rail linkages with the country, building
11 bridges from Mazar-i-Sharif to Kabul and a railway
line, supported by the United States and ADB, from
Heraton to Mazar-i-Sharif. These rail lines could be
linked to other railways in Afghanistan resulting in
“railroad frenzy” because interested parties are building new links to Iran, Central Asia, and China.45
In this context, securing Afghanistan’s second
largest, southern city of Kandahar is crucial after the
pullout of troops because it offers a key to developing
the country’s Ring Road and facilitating nationwide
development and ensuring access to the Pakistani
port of Gwadar, the Middle East, Central Asia, and
Europe.46 Afghanistan also looks to develop links to
the port at Chabahar, which competes with Gwadar
port that Russia, India, and Iran are developing.
The construction of railways and roads in Afghanistan is essential for the country’s and wider region’s
development and integration with the global economy. ADB estimates that the completion of roads in Afghanistan would increase trade among neighbors by
160 percent and do so via Afghanistan by 113 percent,
raising Afghan exports by 14 percent (U.S.$5.8 billion)
and imports by 16 percent (U.S.$6.7 billion). Meanwhile, the transcontinental trade is forecast to increase
Afghanistan’s GDP growth by anywhere between 8.812.7 percent, indicating the importance of Afghanistan
for the transcontinental trade and the latter’s importance for Afghanistan’s own development.47
Improving rail and road links of Afghanistan with
its neighbors and pursuing regional energy transmission projects for and through Afghanistan are some of
the major initiatives pursued as part of the deepening
cooperation within the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA). RECCA’s
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participants in 2012 agreed on a number of deals in
the following areas: “infrastructure, human resource
development, investment and trade, regional disaster
risk management, and regional fiber optic connectivity.”48 Besides being a member of RECCA, Afghanistan has applied for WTO membership and is also a
member of CAREC, OSCE, the South and Central Asia
Trade Forum, all of which are necessary for enhancing
the country’s development and role as a key transcontinental integrator.49
Afghanistan’s success as a transcontinental integrator depends on overcoming significant regional
security, geopolitical, and economic development
challenges after decades of conflict in the country,
which stymie the integration between Central and
South Asia and undermine the regions’ global economic integration. This success also depends on the
manner in which Iran (bordering Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan and sharing cultural affinity
with Tajikistan) and its Western partners manage to
turn their adversarial relationship into a fruitful, lasting engagement. Such impending cooperation may
lead to fundamental realignments in the Middle East,
Central and South Asia, affecting Afghanistan and the
regions’ external connectivity.
IRAN’S ISOLATION AND IMPENDING
ENTENTE WITH THE WEST:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL ASIA
The ongoing talks between Iran and the West over
Tehran’s controversial nuclear program following a
series of most stringent sanctions to date have opened
prospects for the development of a more cooperative relationship between Iran and the West. Such a
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development portends significant implications for
Central and South Asia, not to mention the Middle
East. While similar talks have failed in the past, history knows examples of transformational shifts once
a set of conditions are aligned. Tehran’s outreach to
the West to pursue the talks occurred in the circumstances of Iran’s increasingly isolated and failing
economy. Meanwhile, the rise of United States as a
major global energy producer has led to changes in
regional and global energy balances. Furthermore, the
greater Middle East has seen a number of volatile geopolitical dynamics in recent years, including the wars
in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as well as the Arab
Spring. These and other factors have provided an impetus to impending and substantive, yet not necessarily assured, improvement in the relationship between
Iran and Western countries.
No one knows for certain when, or if, this improvement will occur, but actors need to be prepared
to capitalize on this development and harness related
implications to benefit their policies. This is especially
true for Central Asian states and Afghanistan, which
have treated their ties with Iran with caution due to
tensions between Iran and the West and their own
concerns about Tehran’s ambitions.50 These countries may gain from Iran’s integration into the global
economy, despite possible adverse effects on Central
Asian energy exporters that will be incentivized to
pursue diversification of their energy exports-dependent economies. Led by the newly elected President
Hassan Rouhani, who replaced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2013, the Iranian administration seeks to make
multi-literalism and the expansion of ties with international economic institutions a foreign policy priority as a way to contribute to “global norm-setting.”51
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If it can reemerge as a responsible actor, both Iran and
countries throughout Central and South Asia will be
able to ensure a smoother and more secure connectivity to the global economy. That said, actors should
also be prepared to face potential adverse risks stemming from the realignment of geopolitical relations in
the region stretching from the Middle East to South
Asia. This especially concerns the relationships between predominantly Sunni and Shiite states on the
one hand, and the ties between the United States and
Saudi Arabia, among others, on the other.
A number of existing and planned projects with
Iran’s participation reveal the potential impact of such
improved ties despite, indeed because of, sanctions
that have prompted Iran’s engagement with Central and South Asia. Tehran’s agreement to limit its
nuclear program in return for easing of the sanctions
has led to an uptick in economic rhetoric and relations
between India and Iran, demonstrating the prospects
of Iran’s expanding relations with Central and South
Asian states. India and Iran are particularly interested
in finishing the Chabahar port, which will enable them
to connect with Central Asia and Afghanistan. Currently, Pakistan impedes India’s effort to trade with
Afghanistan, despite allowing some Afghan exports
to reach India. Having the port, to which India has
committed U.S.$100 million after investing U.S.$100
million to construct a 220 kilometer-long road linking
Afghanistan and Chabahar, will be a game changer for
India and Iran. This is especially so because Chabahar
competes with the Pakistani port at Gwadar, which
China helped finance to facilitate energy and trade
flows to and from its western regions.52
Iran is increasingly projecting its economic and
political influence in northwestern Afghanistan and
southern Turkmenistan, building roads and railways
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linking it to Afghanistan and Central Asia. While
its investments in Afghanistan are not substantial,
its reach is growing, driven as it is by the desire to
avoid the impact of international sanctions.53 Just as
the United States, China, India, Central Asian countries, and the current government in Kabul, Shiite
Iran is not interested in the comeback to power of the
Wahhabi ideology-inspired Taliban in Afghanistan,
where Tajiks make up about one third of the country’s
predominantly Sunni Muslim population. Iran works
closely with Tajikistan and Afghanistan to prevent
this scenario and break the relative isolation of all the
three Persian-speaking countries from regional and
global economic networks. This trilateral partnership
is unlikely to turn into a political or military alliance
soon, but it does enable Iran to increase its influence in
Central Asia, allowing Tajikistan and Afghanistan to
access regional markets. Such cooperation is expected
to promote the reconnection of Central and South
Asia within and with the Middle East. In this context,
and facing Turkey’s relatively active foreign policy in
the Middle East and beyond, Tehran has sought to expand its ties with Central Asian countries, primarily
by participating in transport and hydro-energy projects. These are the areas of collaboration that Tehran,
Dushanbe and Kabul can hardly ignore given their
isolation from global markets and post-2014 regional
security concerns.
In 2010, Tehran and Dushanbe signed a new defense treaty, agreeing to deepen their economic ties.
Iran’s trade and investment in Tajikistan stood at
U.S.$250 and U.S.$650 million in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Iran helped construct the Anzob tunnel,
which runs 5,000 meters and links Dushanbe and
Ta-jikistan’s second largest city of Khujand. The
tunnel
123

helps Tajikistan avoid a potential transport blockade
by Uzbekistan and ensures Tajikistan’s and Iran’s
further connection to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and South Asian ports through Afghanistan and
Pakistan, cutting travel time from Central Asia to Iran
by 4-5 hours. In a sign of support to Tajikistan, Tehran
threatened to block Uzbek rail cargo running via Iran
if Uzbekistan did not lift its 6-month-long blockade on
freights en route to Sangtuda-2 hydro-station—Iran’s
U.S.$180 million investment project in Tajikistan
viewed as a tool to rectify Tajikistan’s energy shortages and as a threat to Uzbekistan’s agriculture and
leverage over the upstream Tajikistan. Nevertheless,
Iran and Uzbekistan maintain a strong trade relationship. Iran invested in the construction of the corridor
linking Tashkent, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Heart, connecting to the Chabahar port in the Gulf of Oman and
ending at Bandar Abbas in the Persian Gulf.54 Iran further cooperates with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan,
which in 2013 completed a 540 mile-long railway line
linking Kazkah Ozen with Turkmen Etrek through
Uzbekistan and now plan to connect it to the Iranian
rail network. The line would give Central Asian countries another outlet to the Persian Gulf.55
However, Iran has worked to prevent Kazakhstan
and Azerbaijan from building underwater pipelines
across the Caspian on environmental grounds, which
impedes East-West connections.56 The unresolved status of the Caspian prevents littoral states from exploiting the region’s vast energy resources and delivering
them to regional and global energy markets.
Overall, however, regional countries could benefit
immensely from Iran’s involvement in transcontinental trade, energy, and transit initiatives, enabling Central and South Asian states to access ports and markets
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in the Middle East and expand their connectivity with
the global economy. The projects mentioned earlier
suggest the beginning of what could yet result in a
major regional transformation spurred by potentially
improved ties between Tehran and the West.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES:
A WAY FORWARD
Не думай, как бы ни был ты велик, Что ты всего достиг
и все постиг.
(No matter how great you are, do not think that you have
achieved and understood everything).
		
Юсуф Хас Хаджи баласагуни1
		(Yusuf Balasaguni)

ADJUSTING U.S. GRAND STRATEGY
TO NEW ERA DYNAMICS
While the U.S. supremacy is unrivaled and unlikely to end any time soon, the rise of new centers
of power has challenged the U.S. traditional role and
efforts to shape global and regional security orders.
“Multicentricity,”2 or even “nonpolarity,”3 as well as
the dispersion and fluidity of power spurring new
modes of interaction are now the defining features of
the international system. This system rests on international economic, financial, and institutional linkages
spanning the entire globe and dynamically interacts
with the process of globalization. It has neither the
place nor the tolerance for unipolarity once ascribed
to the United States in the 1900s. Instead, it has plenty
of room for numerous actors exercising influence in a
variety of areas. This makes it imperative for Washington to adjust the means of its grand strategy in the
age of austerity and rely more on diplomacy and multilateral efforts to shape regional trajectories. The U.S.
grand strategy should seek to: 1) ensure secure global
commons; 2) advance globalization; and 3) forestall
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the rise of an actor capable of displacing the United
States as the rule-setting global power and disrupting
the global security and economic order.
The U.S. Navy’s mission as “a global force for
good” reflects the increasingly crucial U.S. role in the
world4 as the United States withdraws its troops from
Afghanistan, pivots to Asia Pacific, deals with instability in the Middle East, works to support Europe’s security, and encourages Central Asia’s integration into
the global economy on terms that are more favorable
to long-term global and regional stability rather than
narrow visions of select actors. Doing all this at once,
and with similar level of effectiveness, determination,
and foresight as during the Cold War, will be no easy
task in the new realities of the 21st century. But the
United States should not forget its legacy and role in
advancing global connectivity and stability. It helped
rebuild and accommodate in the international system
the now prosperous and secure yet once revisionist,
post-World War II Germany and Japan. It has further
radically advanced the centuries-old process of globalization—especially after the collapse of the Soviet
Union—which has brought millions out of poverty,
contributed to the rise of more prosperous societies,
and is yet to absorb countries on the periphery of the
global economy, including in Central and South Asia.
(See Figure 5-1.)
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Source: World Bank, taken from Christopher Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawano, Benjamin Brewer, “Trade Globalization since 1795: Waves of Integration in the World System,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 65,
No 1, February 2000, pp.77-95.

Figure 5-1. Core, Semi-periphery, and Periphery,
Late-20th Century.
As Central Asia’s connectivity gap shrinks, the
region is increasingly moving from the periphery of
the global economy to the center of global geopolitics,5 with China, India, the European Union (EU), and
Russia all eyeing opportunities to shape regional outcomes and challenging the United States to channel
related processes for the benefit of a more stable regional and global security order. This imperative becomes stronger given the intensifying rivalries among
great powers and Central Asian states themselves
over access to resources, routes, markets, bases, and
opportunities. While Russia has enjoyed a predominant security presence in the region for decades, its
position may soon change, as evidenced by the U.S.
military involvement after September 11, 2001 (9/11)
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and China’s expected military expansion to protect its
economic interests across the continent.
A potential militarization of the region—without
a durable institutional security framework and amid
rapid power transitions—threatens not only the regional stability but may result in the imposition of a
one-sided vision of the region’s economic future and
its place in the global economy. Speculations already
surface about the possibility of Russia deploying
troops to the south of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, or
China intervening in Central Asia if Russia is incapable of ensuring regional security after the pull-out
of coalition forces from Afghanistan, which may well
translate into long-term military presence based on
principles of domination and exclusion. Meanwhile,
the economic expansion of a rising global power with
a zero-sum approach to international affairs may
advance the region’s external connectivity in a onedimensional way. While beneficial in many respects
for expanding the region’s connectivity, China’s and
Russia’s integration efforts can be inward-looking and
constrain related processes.
The global and regional trends are thus forcing the
United States to develop and pursue “a coherent Eurasian strategy that integrates European, Middle Eastern, South Asian and East Asian policy into a comprehensive design.” 6 The United States should work with
potential rivals in constructive ways, striving to turn
them into partners and allies of the evolving global
and regional orders while recognizing that such actors currently seek to challenge its global and regional
agenda in the world and Central Asia. In the process,
the logic of its grand strategy should be premised on
one simple reality: global commons are “central to the
maintenance of U.S. power and influence,” and the
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United States has been committed to global commons
as the “connective tissue of the international system”
for decades.7 As part of this commitment, and amid
the rise of new powers, it needs to assess long-term
economic and military balances and identify likely allies early on in order to focus its current policies on
future intended outcomes.8
The rise of China, India, and resurgence of Russia—all geopolitically dynamic powers whose rising
global influence is inevitably linked with their regional presence in the neighboring Central Asia—call for
a more subtle, engaged, long-term, and concerted U.S.
regional strategy. Such strategy should naturally feed
into the U.S. grand strategy and focus on the pursuit of
the following broad vectors to expand Central Asia’s
external connectivity: calibrating U.S. military role in
greater Central Asia; addressing risks of inter- and
intrastate conflicts in Central and South Asia; boosting U.S. economic role and presence in the broader region; cooperating with established and rising powers
to shape the region’s connectivity. As it pursues these
vectors, Washington should be mindful of the need
to cooperate and, where necessary, compete with established and rising powers in the region, as well as
to leverage desires, sometimes necessities, of Central
Asian countries in expanding the U.S. long-term role
and presence in the region.
CALIBRATING U.S. MILITARY ROLE IN
GREATER CENTRAL ASIA
POST-AFGHANISTAN
By the end of 2016, the United States plans to withdraw most of its forces from Afghanistan, but its future military role and presence in greater Central Asia
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is still uncertain. The United States has committed too
much in time, blood, treasure, and credibility to leave
Afghanistan and Central Asia to their fate, making it
imperative to continue efforts aimed at developing
and integrating Central and South Asia with the global economy. Washington would need to apply a certain level of military capability and political finesse to
create and sustain conditions for a smooth transition
out of Afghanistan in the short term, a stable regional
development in the medium term, and prevention of
regional militarization and arms race in the long term.
The United States has a unique opportunity to prolong
its broader regional military presence and advance its
agenda—a notable imperative considering the need
for possible future missions as other actors increase
their own military capabilities, including in Central
Asia. If it fails now, the projected military expansion
by other actors will make this task far more difficult in
the future.
In its military strategy, Washington should afford
Central Asia a larger and distinctly regional role. The
strategy should focus on:
1. continuing to support counterterrorism, antidrug trafficking, and special operations capabilities
of regional states as ends in themselves and as a platform for more substantive military cooperation in the
future;
2. arranging for temporary and permanent basing
rights;
3. advancing reforms of local armed forces and
interoperability as part of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PfP)
Programs and bilateral ties;
4. boosting military-to-military and civilian-to-civilian contacts and cooperation in the area of defense
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and emergency management through education programs and military exercises;
5. capitalizing on the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) achievements to promote partnerships;
6. preventing further militarization and arms race,
especially in the Caspian to the west and the Fergana
Valley to the south;
7. encouraging indigenous approaches to managing collective security and related institution building
as pillars of regional and global stability; and,
8. cultivating ally and partner military ties with all
major players for confidence building purposes and
contingencies that may require a joint military action
in support of U.S. security interests.
The United States is unlikely to secure heavy or
permanent military presence in the region given the
objections of Russia, China, Iran, and some elites in
Central Asian countries. Any such presence could
contribute to the militarization of and arms race in the
greater region bordering four nuclear-armed powers
(potentially five if Iran “goes nuclear”). But the United States needs to have a military role and presence
sufficient to discourage attempts at military domination and protect the region’s push for inclusion into
the global economy, while retaining the flexibility to
choose whether to intervene in any particular situation or conflict in the region.
The conflicts in Ukraine and the South China Sea
have shown the need for Washington to reinforce
its support for allies and partners in the post-Soviet
space and East Asia, as well as for its allies to assume
a greater share of responsibility for their defense by
relieving the military burden on the United States.
This imperative is acute, given the rise of potential
military challengers, strong domestic and overseas
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opposition to controversial instances of U.S. military
presence, and significant cuts in U.S. defense spending. Washington should encourage Japan, South Korea, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (UK)
to contribute a larger share to NATO, the protection
of global commons, and their own national defense. A
reduction of military burden could allow the United
States to focus on military deployment, planned or in
response to conflicts, in areas that are critical to its interests but lacking adequate security infrastructure, as
in Central Asia.9
Any military deployment in Central Asia is bound
to be a political, geographic, and logistical challenge,
given the potentially unstable regimes, prevalent corruption, complex terrain, weak military infrastructure,
remoteness of the United States, and lack of interoperability, not to mention significant security or political influence of other actors, nascent military reforms,
and weak armed forces of regional countries. These
challenges require Washington to provide targeted
military assistance, focus on advancing capabilities
allowing for deployment of special or light forces at
short notice, and advancing its institutional military
ties with the region. Washington should tread with
caution: the more it involves itself in Central Asia
militarily, the more responsive it is expected to be, potentially putting itself in a complex position obligating
it to intervene during an intra- or interstate conflict
when a preferred option may be not to do so.10
Consequently, boosting military-to-military and
civilian-to-civilian contacts and defense cooperation via education programs and military exercises
is a forward-looking strategy to ensure sustained
military collaboration with counterparts in Central
Asian countries without provoking hostile reactions
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by other powers to U.S. alleged ambitions in the
broader region.
Washington and its Central Asian partners should
consider raising the quantity and quality of educational exchange programs involving respective future
military and civilian defense leaders. U.S. professional
military schools, including staff and war colleges, as
well as the Near East South Asia Center at the National Defense University in the United States and
the George C. Marshall European Center for Security
Studies in Germany already serve as major platforms
for such program activities. But these institutions
should strengthen their alumni programs in order to
retain critical ties with potential leaders. If not done already, engaging alumni in research and development
of practical recommendations in the areas of defense
and emergency preparedness on an institutional level
would enhance the alumni programs and encourage
in Central Asia the concept and practice of think tanks
as influencers of military and defense policy. Providing financial support and expertise for the purpose
of building public policy think tanks would promote
and signal a more engaged and lasting presence in
the region.
The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and
U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) should, in
turn, enhance the frequency and scope of military exercises and general collaboration programming with
counterparts in Central and South Asia. The exercises
should necessarily rest on multinational collaboration
frameworks, emphasizing as they are development
and reconstruction, humanitarian aid, emergency
preparedness, disaster relief, and anti-terrorism components. Of growing importance will be the need to
strengthen collaboration among and between US-
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CENTCOM, USEUCOM, and the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) as well as militaries of
Central and South Asian countries. This is important
given the transnational nature of security threats, the
need to foster interoperability within and between
command units, and the position of Central and South
Asia as the bridge connecting volatile states in the
Middle East, relatively fragile countries in Eastern
and Central Europe, and militarily growing powers in
Southeast Asia. Unlike permanent deployments, enhancing military exercises and cooperation programs
would allow the United States to retain and continue
to enhance military and defense ties with partners in
Central and South Asia without having to face major
financial challenges and objections of local players to
U.S. alleged ambitions. Washington should commit
a portion of freed-up resources after its military disengagement from Afghanistan toward building more
sustained military-to-military and civilian-to-civilian
partnerships with regional counterparts. This imperative is critical because U.S. withdrawal is expected to
undercut the already low level of military and nonmilitary aid to Central and South Asian states and
undermine the perceived importance of the broader
region for U.S. security interests, policymakers, strategic planners, and even U.S. allies and partners.
As they pull out of Afghanistan, the United States
and its allies plan to move out about 30 percent of
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) material and equipment via NDN. Their reliance on the
network is therefore expected to remain steady at
least through 2014, though it is likely to eventually
decline precipitously or simply end altogether. Washington should assess carefully the type and amount
of equipment it leaves in Central Asia in return for
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further military ties, assuring its regional counterparts that the United States will continue to provide
military assistance in order to build strong regional
counter-terrorism, anti-drug trafficking, and deployable peacekeeping capabilities—all in line with the
USCENTCOM 2013 Posture Statement.11
The NDN has provided a platform for U.S. military and economic cooperation with the region, making it important for Washington to use this legacy to
cultivate military ties and advance partner capacity
with regional countries on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Given the geopolitical dynamics in the region, the Unites States is likely to seek basing rights
in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan that pursue a more
autonomous policy compared to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which depend heavily on China and Russia
for economic and military aid and have declined U.S.
efforts at prolonging its presence. The United States
entertained plans to establish a military base or Rapid
Response Center in Uzbekistan, which suspended its
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) membership in 2012 and now hosts a NATO center tasked
with defense planning, military education, and civil
emergency preparedness. It also considers the possibility of security of a facility at the Kazakh port city
of Aktau on the Caspian Sea. However, littoral Russia
and Iran are likely to derail this effort.
While it is inevitable that the United States will
deepen its military ties with select Central Asian
countries, it should seek to advance its partnerships
with all regional states and in a way that genuinely
seeks to build multilateral, intraregional initiatives,
relationships, and dynamics. This is critical as Washington seeks to promote win-win outcomes as part of
New Silk Road Strategy (NSRS) and prevent militari-
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zation as spurred by actors from within and outside
the region. This is why the U.S. military role should
cultivate a more durable and long-term institutional
security infrastructure by fostering multilateral partnerships with countries in and outside the region,
encouraging Central Asian states to pursue collective solutions to the management of common security
challenges. Rivalries of outside powers and conflicts
among Central Asian states without a durable institutional framework in place (not imposed, but inclusive
and collective) is a recipe for disaster of continental
proportions, which Washington should work to avoid.
ADDRESSING RISKS OF INTERSTATE AND
INTRASTATE CONFLICTS
IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA
The United States should accompany its military
role with a security and political strategy to prevent,
mitigate, and address the risks of intra- and interstate
conflicts in the wider region of Central and South Asia,
which could hamper the region’s internal and external
connectivity. In Central Asia, it should focus related
policies on addressing prevalent poverty, corruption,
weak rule of law, and lack of economic development,
as well conflict prevention and mitigation specifically
tailored for the Fergana Valley, known for potentially
volatile disputes involving Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan over water, energy, land access, and border issues. Encouraging cooperative policies by Uzbekistan, which borders all four Central Asian states
plus Afghanistan, in these areas would stimulate regional cooperation. The United States should promote
Kazakhstan’s regional integration efforts and utilize
Astana’s growing clout to advance security and stabil-
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ity in the broader region, while encouraging Tashkent
to do the same.
In the Caspian, the United States should foster cooperation among the littoral states, especially among
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Iran (subject to the impending rapprochement between Tehran
and the West), which collectively represents one of
the world’s most energy-rich areas and yet-to-be-developed trade and transit nodes linking Central Asia,
the Caucasus, and Europe. Given the growing levels
of militarization in the region, Washington should
discourage interstate tensions, prevent conflicts over
energy resources and their transit, and encourage the
littoral states to resolve the status of the Caspian sooner rather than later.
In South Asia, Washington should work with Islamabad and Delhi to mitigate perceptions of the
Pakistani-Indian rivalry, advance confidence-building
mechanisms, and develop bilateral and multilateral
frameworks of response to the risks of international
terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the process, it should assist Pakistan in building stronger anti-terrorism capabilities
to ensure Pakistan’s viability as a state and ease the
concerns of Central Asian states about developing ties
with this nuclear-armed, terrorism-stricken, Islamic
state.12 Of particular importance is the need for the
United States to promote economic ties between India
and Pakistan, which with time could improve the security relationship between the perceived rivals.
As it seeks to develop policies for Central and
South Asia, Washington should continue efforts at
developing and imbedding the conveniently located
Afghanistan into inter-regional dynamics. However,
it needs to commit the necessary level of effort, co-
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ordination, leadership, and financial resources to
advance this goal in concert with other actors. While
U.S. policies may get it right on paper, they lack vigor, not to mention financial resources and long-term
strategic commitment. But it is the advancement of
Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s development that is imperative for boosting the connectivity between Central and South Asia and integrating this wider region
into the global economy as an integrated, dynamic
economic unit.
Fostering indigenous, collective security cooperation frameworks and institutions within and, with
time, between the two regions will be fundamentally
important to prevent or mitigate external pressures toward creating exclusive spheres of influence centered
on rising powers. Of course, building collective security institutions with rising powers will, too, be important for confidence-building purposes and to manage the rise of these powers. But this process should
necessarily factor in the need to ensure appropriate
balancing by other actors to maintain stability. Given
constrains on its military and economic capabilities,
Washington needs to boost the use of diplomacy. This
is critical because the rise of new power centers makes
the application of U.S. military power harder, increasingly requiring it to rely on diplomacy to advance its
goals, including that of enhancing its economic role
and presence in Central and South Asia.
BOOSTING U.S. ECONOMIC ROLE AND
PRESENCE IN THE BROADER REGION
The United States should recognize the potential
of its military and security policies to contribute to
militarization of the region, as well as the limits of its
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“hard power” in fostering connectivity without relying on economic presence, which is currently and
precariously lacking in substance and commitment.
It should match its efforts at reforming or advancing
global security, financial, and economic institutions in
light of the rise of new powers with efforts on the regional level in Central Asia as well. It should be sensitive to concerns of Central Asian countries about risks
that are likely to stem from the integration with South
Asia, given the instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It should also highlight the benefits of economic
connectivity between the two regions for prosperity
and general stability in what could be a much more
volatile broader region.
Washington needs to pursue a more concerted effort to realize the vision of its NSRS, which needs more
financial resources, leadership, and coordination. Actors view this economic strategy as a substitute for
the military disengagement from Afghanistan, but do
not find it resourceful enough, especially as the impending military pull-out threatens to undermine the
NDN-generated business activity. The United States
needs to support the engagement of American and
Western businesses, encourage diversification of energy, trade, and transit links, as well as advance reforms
to boost the region’s economic development potential.
Providing aid will be crucial, but helping advance local business capacity and private sector engagement is
a much more durable, long-term, and ultimately selfsustaining approach to regional development.
The United States should develop the “software”
component of its economic policies with a view to improve the business climate and expand international
flows of regional countries. This entails reducing tariff
and nontariff trade barriers as part of the Trade and
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Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) and working with development and financial institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Improving governance
and enhancing transparency as part of related democratization programs will remain critical for promoting
and sustaining accountable governments that are keen
on intra- and extraregional integration.
In terms of the “hardware” component, it should
provide more direct support to Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) and Central Asia
South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project
(CASA-1000), as well as assign priorities and allocate
funding for specific energy, trade, and transit regional
and inter-regional infrastructure projects. U.S. direct
engagement will be a signal for other actors who may
be interested in such projects but have security concerns to participate in them. Unfortunately, the lack of
commitment to the NSRS by Washington itself reveals
a low priority assigned by the United States to the
region and its importance for U.S. interests, regardless of theoretical arguments that otherwise require a
deeper and more substantive U.S. engagement in the
region. While sustaining a military role in the region
is important to ensure a more seamless integration
of Central and South Asia into the global economy,
having no substantial economic stake in the region,
puts the United States at a heavy disadvantage in its
nascent but increasingly important strategic relationships with Central Asian states.
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COOPERATING WITH OTHER ACTORS TO
SHAPE CONNECTIVITY OF CENTRAL AND
SOUTH ASIA
The United States does not enjoy considerable
economic presence in Central Asia. Nor is it expected
to commit needed financial, political, and diplomatic
resources to promote its global and regional goals by
leveraging its regional influence, even if this imperative has grown in urgency. Hence, besides improving
on its performance as part of the NSRS and general
economic presence, Washington should work with
established and rising powers to advance Central
Asia’s connectivity. Given the current and projected
global and regional dynamics, it should find cooperation with Japan, the EU, Turkey, and India especially
substantive and important. This does not suggest that
Tokyo, Brussels, Istanbul, or Delhi will not pursue
their autonomous global and regional roles; they will.
But in their search for those roles, their goals in the
region are more or less aligned with those of the United States, whose backing they will need to advance
their interests. While cooperation with Russia may be
strained in the medium term, China’s global rise will
encourage a more cooperative U.S.-Russian partnership in the long run. Iran is a wild card. If Washington
and Tehran pull it off, Washington could rely on Iran
as a major bulwark against policies of domination of
other players in Central Asia and beyond.
Japan.
Central Asian countries look up to Japan, an Asian
partner, a resource-poor yet technologically advanced
country, which commands respect for rebuilding its
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economy after World War II and relying on soft approach to promote its policies in Central Asia. Its role
in advancing global and regional trade is unquestionable. Nor is its role in providing regional countries with leverage vis-à-vis other powers, especially
China, as Central Asia is increasingly integrated with
the dynamically developing Southeast Asia. Japan is a
major global and regional donor, providing assistance
to Afghanistan and Central Asia in areas as critical as
human development, trade, and transit facilitation, as
well as infrastructure development. China’s rise calls
on Washington and Tokyo to enhance coordination of
their regional policies in Central Asia.
The European Union.
Besides being one of the largest trade partners, the
EU is a source of substantial development assistance
in a wide range of areas important for the region’s
economic development and integration into the global economy. From governance, public sector reforms,
and democratization to border management and conflict prevention, the EU’s engagement is critical for
the United States, which seeks to advance transparent governments and open societies in Central Asian
countries that require urgent political and economic
reforms to advance in the modern world. The EU,
United States, and India should find cooperation on
democratization especially pertinent, given the heavy
security and state-led economic roles of Russia and
China in the region. The EU’s relationship with Central Asia is a must for developing the westward vector
of the region’s external connectivity by focusing on
energy, trade, and transit development.
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Turkey.
Turkey has attained a greater global role over
the last decade, but it still remains a middle-ranked
power. Its regional role and presence is unlikely to
meet strong resistance in Central Asia, and Washington should be mindful of this reality in its approach
to the region. Turkey’s expanding trade and economic
relationship with all Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) countries is a strong indicator of Ankara’s
autonomous role as a NATO ally and its interest to
develop economic linkages with actors in the east.
Turkey offers lots of positive development experiences for the region, which Washington should use when
advancing its regional policies. Turkey has made substantial progress in advancing its democratization and
economic development, positioning itself as an energy
and trade hub and an integrator keen on connecting
the energy-rich Caspian and Central Asia with markets in Europe. Further, Turkey has actively supported security efforts in Afghanistan and, as a NATO
ally sharing cultural and regional knowledge of wider
Central Asia, assumed and pursued effectively NATO’s regional role in the region. Moreover, numerous
Western businesses are already relying on Turkey and
Turkish firms for operations in Central Asia, making it a critical conduit for Western investment and
technology transfers to the region.
India.
India’s “connect” policy is in line with the longstanding U.S. strategy of reconnecting Central and
South Asia. India is an important military and economic partner in rebuilding Afghanistan and, if
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needed, managing China’s rise on both the land and
the high seas. It can be a greater source of counterterrorism capabilities for the regional countries. Its
democratic political tradition and economic success
as a developing nation is an important asset for Central Asian states, which both Delhi and Washington
should utilize to improve regional political and economic systems. While emerging slowly, India’s regional economic presence is set to grow considerably
over the next decades if India keeps similar economic
growth dynamics. India’s involvement in the region
will be pronounced in the energy sphere, especially
if TAPI, CASA-1000, and other projects materialize.
The substantial presence of Russia and China in Central Asia, the uncertainty surrounding the future of
Afghanistan, and the region’s potential to serve as a
transcontinental trade, energy, and transit hub point
to the benefits of the United States and India working together to advance the region’s stability and
connectivity.
Russia.
On the security front, cooperating with Russia as
the major regional security actor is important for ensuring regional stability, and the United States should
continue advancing cooperation in counterterrorism,
anti-drug trafficking, and counterproliferation, while
promoting confidence-building measures as part of
a broader regional security agenda, not least due to
the rise of China. Advancing cooperation on these issues will help gradually build mutual confidence and
allow Washington to pursue policies toward Central
Asia that are not hostage to Russia’s objections or interference. In the current climate of strained ties, do-
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ing so may be more difficult than anticipated. This is
especially so because Moscow views Washington as a
spoiler after a decade of war in Afghanistan that has
left behind instability and security risks in the form of
expanded drug trafficking, refugee flows, and crossborder militancy. Russia further objects to the U.S.
Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative, viewing as a
tool for Washington to augment its regional military
presence in Central Asia and gather military intelligence on CSTO members. But long-term trends and
China’s continued rise as a global economic and, soon,
military power suggests more room for a more constructive partnership between the United States and
Russia. On the economic front, Washington should
welcome Russia’s participation in regional projects
promoting north-south or south-north connectivity,
provided such participation involves multilateral cooperation and is as less politicized, imposing, or onedimensional as possible.
China.
Cooperating with China is critical for the global
stability and the future of the broader region, given
Beijing’s rapidly growing economic presence, expanding global trade profile, and the need for the United
States to encourage China-led energy, trade, and transit connections in all directions to further shrink Central Asia’s connectivity gap. China’s economic role is
also important for Afghanistan and Pakistan. China’s
growing investment in both countries is becoming increasingly essential for the long-term stability, development, and regional integration of Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Washington should therefore encourage
China’s push for advancing the regions’ connectiv-
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ity with the global economy. But like in the case with
Russia, it should discourage any attempts by Beijing
aimed at pursuing policies of economic domination
in the region and encourage to the extent possible the
economic engagement of actors as diverse as India,
Pakistan, Turkey and, with time, Iran. This would
provide Central Asian states with more options and
room to maneuver on the regional and global stage,
which China’s growing economic and military clout is
bound to redefine sooner than later.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5
1. A quote by Yusuf Khass Hajib Balasaguni, a great poet from
Balasaghun, the capital of the Karakhanid Empire, in present-day
Kyrgyzstan. Direct, non-literary translation of the quote into English (based on a Russian translation of the Turkic-written quote)
is provided here.
2. Daniel Wolfish and Gordon Smith, “Governance and Policy
in a Multicentric World,” Canadian Public Policy, Vol. 26, No. 2,
2006, pp. 51-72.
3. Richard Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity,” Foreign Affairs,
May-June 2008.
4. Robert Kaplan, “The Gift of American Power,” Stratfor,
May 14, 2014.
5. Pamela Spratlen, “Integrating Central Asia into the World
Economy: Perspectives from the Region and the U.S.,” Speech at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington,
DC, October 22, 2007.
6. Walter Russell Mead, “The End of History Ends,” The
American Interest, December 2, 2014.
7. Lynn Davis, Stacie Pettyjohn, Melanie Sisson, Stephen
Worman, and Michael McNerney, U.S. Overseas Military Presence: What Are the Strategic Choices? Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2012, p. 29.
152

8. Charles Wolf, Siddhartha Dalal, Julie DaVanzo, Eric Larson,
Alisher Akhmedjonov, et al., China and India, 2025: A Comparative
Assessment, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011, p. 112.
9. Davis et. al., p. xii.
10. Olga Oliker and Thomas Szayna, eds., Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S.
Army, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003, pp. xxii;
240, 299-305.
11. Quoted in Stephen J. Blank, ed., Central Asia After 2014,
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Press, November 2013, p. 3.
12. Rollie Lal, Central Asia and Its Asian Neighbors: Security and
Commerce at the Crossroads, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006, p. 27.

153

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Central Asian countries largely had been closed
to the outside world during the Soviet times. But the
opening up of China in the 1980s, the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991, and the advance of globalization ever since have enabled them to connect with the
global economy as independent units. The U.S. military involvement after September 11, 2001 (9/11) and
the engagement by Japan, the European Union (EU),
and Turkey have allowed the regional countries to
shrink their connectivity gaps even further. More profoundly, it is China’s rapidly growing global and regional profile, India’s slow but progressing reconnection with the region, and Russia’s energized efforts to
integrate the former Soviet space that today are shaping profoundly the region’s external connectivity.
Central and South Asia are the few remaining areas
in the periphery that are rapidly integrating into the
global economy. In the 21st century, it is Central Asia
that is going to serve as the conduit of the transcontinental integration in Eurasia, following as it is the integrations across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in previous decades.1 Information, energy, trade, and transit
links are expanding within and between Central Asia,
other parts of Eurasia, and the world. Kazakhstan has
emerged as the economic powerhouse keen on regional and global integration. Kyrgyzstan has suffered
from political instability and a fragile economy, but
has relied on its more democratic profile and re-export
capacity to build its internal and external linkages.
Tajikistan, in turn, has seen its efforts hampered by
a weak economy, strained ties with Uzbekistan, and
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challenging geographic position that, while constraining its external connectivity in the short term, enables
it to serve as a key inter-regional link with South Asia
in the long term. Uzbekistan’s economy has suffered
from pervasive state control that limits severely its potential for regional and global integration, but it has
been a strong performer and has significant untapped
capacity for more efficient domestic development and
extensive connectivity with the broader region. Turkmenistan has suffered from a closed economy, but
it has greatly expanded its energy export potential,
thereby advancing its external connectivity.
The regional states have a long way to go before
they emerge from the periphery of the global economy.
Intraregional tensions, ineffective political and economic systems, and the lack of strong will to advance
their own viable cooperation system in the region all
serve to undermine related efforts. Major technical,
economic, and political challenges continue constraining their connectivity. The stalled regional integration
processes, the uncertain future of Afghanistan, and
the relative isolation of Iran impede their connectivity
even further.
While Central Asian states remain relatively weak
and continue to rely on external forces and dynamics
to shrink their connectivity gaps, they have learned
the tricks of power politics and demonstrated their
ability to balance interests of great powers while seeking to protect their newly gained sovereignties amid
various visions and models offered or imposed from
the outside. Russia and China are both neighbors and
former imperial masters, with the former maintaining
strong links to the region and the latter emerging as
a global and regional “economic powerhouse.” The
United States enjoys military links with the region by
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virtue of its operation in Afghanistan, while Turkey
and Iran share cultural and expanding economic ties.
The EU, Japan, and India, in turn, have been paying
growing attention to Central Asia, 2 driven as they are
by their own development agendas and geopolitical
realities of a rising China, among other factors.
All these countries offer their visions and programs for the region to engage with them and the rest
of the world, with Central Asian countries at times
eagerly, at times willy-nilly, tagging along. A recent
survey found that in terms of imports of consumer
goods, investments and labor resources, people in Kazakhstan view the United States, the EU, and Russia
as the most economically attractive partners. In terms
of the most attractive sources of investment, people
in Tajikistan point to China, in Uzbekistan to Japan.3
According to a survey of perceptions of trust in intra- and extraregional partners, Russia is considered
the most trustworthy, and China is considered more
trustworthy than the United States. Regional countries received low trust points for each other, with Uzbekistan ranked the lowest. Kazakhstan is viewed as
more trustworthy in Kyrgyzstan.4 Russian, American,
European, Chinese, and Islamic civilizational vectors
of development are all seen as interacting and competing in the region. India is not yet represented, but is
bound to play a major geopolitical role in Eurasia in
the mid to long term.
This is not to say that regional countries lack their
own visions and strategies to connect with the world;
they do. But they grapple with far too many and complex internal, regional, and external challenges, which
they find more solvable by pursuing extraregional
ties with major players rather than by also advancing
intraregional collaboration. As they develop, the Cen-
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tral Asian states should keep in mind that intensifying
global competition, as well as geopolitical and economic changes in Eurasia and the world, offer them
immense opportunities to harness related dynamics
and tie them with their intra- and inter-regional development strategies, especially given their vast resources and the growing interests toward the region
by major actors.
Russia-led Customs Union (CU) and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), China’s Silk Road Economic Belt
strategy, India’s “Connect Central Asia” policy, the
U.S. Silk Road Strategy, and economic engagement
by Japan, the EU, and Turkey all provide important
vectors of connectivity for Central and South Asian
countries. More choices ensures more opportunities
for internal and external integration on terms that will
work against exclusive zones, privileged spheres of
influences, or one-directional connectivity.
All of the Central Asian states are already reaping
advantages of the expanding transcontinental trade
and, one way or another, have emphasized their legacy and future roles as conduits of trade and integrators along the ancient and newly sprawling Silk Roads
traversing Central and South Asia. But, while they are
interested in cooperating with diverse partners and expanding trade opportunities, they also treat with caution the choice, and, in some instances, the necessity of
relying on major powers to enhance their connectivity
with the global economy for fear of undermining their
sovereignties in the process of internal and external
integration. This is particularly true of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan that shun integration initiatives
of any kind, but engage with major partners bilaterally on select, strategic projects. In their dealings with
outside actors, Central Asian regimes thus seek to
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pursue multivector policies. Yet, not all of them have
succeeded in pursuing such policies effectively, with
the rapidly developing Kazakhstan, relatively closed
Uzbekistan, and deliberately “neutral” Turkmenistan
being arguably more successful than Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan that depend heavily on Russia and China.
Russia enjoys the predominant military and security presence in the region and is now advancing the
CU and EEU initiatives in the post-Soviet space, in
large part in response to the rapidly expanding geoeconomic and geopolitical role of China in the heart of
Eurasia. Beijing’s role, in turn, will soon entail a much
more assertive political and military engagement by
China to protect its continental interests. China’s growing influence in light of the region’s imperial history
is thus viewed with caution in Central Asian capitals,
in Moscow that seeks to reassert its regional influence,
and in Washington whose global and regional influence is on the decline.
Central Asian states will increasingly require more
diplomatic finesse to manipulate related dynamics.
They would need to benefit from the involvement
of outside actors to expand their connectivity, while
easing associated challenges to their newly gained
sovereignties. This is especially true considering the
long-term rivalry between China and India, the traditional interest of Russia to maintain its influence,
and the uncertain U.S. military and economic roles
in the region. As Central Asia increasingly becomes
a point of rivalry over resources, transit routes, bases,
and business opportunities, it is facing enhanced prospects of connectivity with the world, as well as related
risks that can slow down, derail, or even reverse such
connectivity.
Central Asian states perceive Russia’s integration initiatives and China’s economic expansion as a
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blessing and a curse. They need them to connect with
the global economy, but they cannot afford to sacrifice their sovereignties in return. In the case of India’s
initiatives, they welcome infrastructure development
that provides them with access to the Indian Ocean
and the Middle East, but they fear the spread of instability and accelerated flows of narcotics, refugees,
criminal, and terrorist groups that could come with
the expanded connectivity. Afghanistan, for instance,
is unlikely to achieve stability any time soon, much
less to stem the flows of narcotics that can accelerate
with the construction of rail and road corridors linking the two regions. Meanwhile, the southward connectivity raises concerns about the spread of Islamism
and possible spillovers from lingering tensions between the nuclear-armed India and Pakistan.
As far as the United States, Central Asian countries
welcome its presence in order to balance other players
in the region, particularly Russia and now increasingly China as well, and to advance their integration with
the global economy. However, they perceive Washington as a noncommitted partner, whose underfunded NSRS they view as a façade of “responsible”
withdrawal from the region rather than a substantive,
long-term strategy. If it fails to enhance its economic
influence, and therefore its stake in Central Asia’s security, the Central Asian countries will have to rely
on geo-economic dynamics driven by Russia, China,
India, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan to shape the region’s
expanding connectivity with the global economy.
The U.S. future global and regional role and capabilities will depend on how well Washington readjusts
its grand strategy in response to the current and projected trends in the new era. The rise of China, India,
and the resurgence of Russia—all capable of challeng-
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ing regional orders—calls for an engaged, long-term,
and concerted U.S. global and, more importantly,
regional strategy in Central Asia, which serves as a
platform for grand strategies of the major powers.
The United States should solidify its regional military role without provoking militarization; advance
the external and inter-regional integration of Central
and South Asia by cooperating with established and
emerging powers and boosting its own economic role
and presence; cooperate and, where necessary, compete with other actors to ensure the regional countries
have more choices of collaboration as they seek linkages with the global economy; address the risks of intra- and interstate conflicts in Central and South Asia
that could threaten or reverse the connectivity of the
regions; and leverage the desires, sometimes necessities, of local countries, in expanding the U.S. longterm role and presence in the greater region.
As Washington calibrates its ends and means, its
assessment of the importance of Central Asia will
hinge on security trends in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Whether Central Asia remains a major pillar of its
grand strategy remains unclear. But the U.S. declared
goals of supporting sovereignty, democratization,
and inter-regional links in the broader region offer
some hope.
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APPENDIX
The charts in this Appendix are from the DHL
2012 Report on Global Connectedness.1 They include
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,
Pakistan, India, China, Russia, Turkey, Japan, and the
United States. Charts for Turkmenistan, Afghanistan,
and the European Union are not available.
ENDNOTES - APPENDIX
1 . Pankaj Ghemawat and Steven Altman, DHL Global Connectedness Index 2012: Analyzing Global Flows and Their Power
to Increase Prosperity, DHL, 2012.
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